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This Article seeks to correct the imbalance that occurs when the First
Amendment and securities fraud collide. Under current precedent,
securities analysts, credit rating agencies, and financial journalists are
subject to differing liability standards depending on whether they are sued
for defamation or for securities fraud Under New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' First Amendment protections apply in the defamation context in
order to prevent the chilling of valuable speech, yet courts have declined to
extend these protections to the securities fraud context. This imbalance
threatens to chill valuable speech about public companies. To prevent the
dangerous chilling effect of potential securities fraud liability, this Article
contends that the Sullivan protections should apply equally in securities
fraud cases. Therefore, under this Article's recommendation, a securities
fraud claim asserted against a noncommercial speaker for speech
concerning a public company cannot prevail absent a showing of actual
malice, by clear and convincing evidence, and subject to independent
appellate review.
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1. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, leading First Amendment attorney James C. Goodale
predicted that the First Amendment and securities regulation were on a
"collision course" because "there is no greater statutory regulation of
speech than the '33 and '34 Securities Acts and the '40 Investment Adviser
and Investment Company Acts.",2 This has been a slow-motion collision. A
number of scholars have posited that various limitations on the
dissemination of truthful information-such as the Quiet Period Rules 3 and
Regulation FDa--fail First Amendment scrutiny, but these regulations have
been only rarely challenged in court,5 likely because, as noted by Professor
Frederick Schauer, "the existence of an established regulatory scheme may
also produce an environment in which the likely challengers to that scheme
have become comfortable with it and have learned how to use it to their
advantage. ' 6 Conversely, a number of litigants have argued that there
should be a First Amendment overlay in securities fraud cases,7 but this
question has been largely ignored by scholars. Without scholarly heft to
support this argument, litigants have been largely unsuccessful in arguing
that the First Amendment has any bearing on securities fraud liability. For
example, the Fourth Circuit recently summarily rejected this argument:
2. James C. Goodale, The First Amendment and Securities Act: A Collision Course?, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 8, 1983, at 1, 1.
3. See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
102 (1995); Lloyd L. Drury, III, Disclosure Is Speech: Imposing Meaningful First Amendment
Constraints on SEC Regulatory Authority, 58 S.C. L. REV. 757, 780 (2007); Susan B. Heyman, The
Quiet Period in a Noisy World: Rethinking Securities Regulation and Corporate Free Speech, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 189, 189 (2013).
4. See Drury, Ill, supra note 3, at 788; Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate
Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 84 (2005).
5. See, e.g., SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (not
reaching the defendant's argument that Regulation FD violated the First Amendment because "the
complaint itself fails to allege a cognizable cause of action for violation of Regulation FD").
6. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1806 (2004).
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
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"Punishing fraud, whether it be common law fraud or securities fraud,
simply does not violate the First Amendment." 8 This Article seeks to fill
this scholarly void by analyzing whether there is a First Amendment
overlay when securities fraud claims are premised on noncommercial
speech.
As an example, imagine a securities analyst who allegedly published
unduly negative research about a public company. If the covered company
sued the analyst for defamation, the analyst would likely be able to rely on
the protections afforded by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its
progeny. 9 In particular, the company would probably be required to prove
by "clear and convincing evidence" that the analyst made the allegedly
false statements with "actual malice," and this actual malice finding would
be subject to independent appellate review.' ° If, on the other hand, an
investor or the Securities and Exchange Commission sued the securities
analyst for securities fraud on the basis of this very same research report,
the analyst would not be able to rely on these constitutional protections,
and the analyst would be exposed to securities fraud liability under lower
standards than required by the Sullivan protections." Therefore, there is an
imbalance between the First Amendment protections that are in place when
the analyst is sued under a defamation theory and when the analyst is sued
under a securities fraud theory.
This Article seeks to correct the imbalance that occurs when the First
Amendment and securities fraud collide. This imbalance threatens to chill
valuable speech about public companies, undercutting the goals of the
Sullivan protections. In particular, this Article contends that the Sullivan
protections should apply in securities fraud cases when the defendant is a
noncommercial speaker (such as an independent securities analyst, credit
rating agency, or financial journalist) and the speech concerns a public
company. 12
8. Id.
9. See 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
10. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 525-26 (6th Cir.
2007) (applying the Sullivan protections in a defamation suit asserted by a rated company against a
credit rating agency); Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ'g, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 648-49 (D. Md.
1992) (applying the Sullivan protections in a defamation suit asserted by an insurance company against
a publisher of investment newsletters).
11. See Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d at 244 (rejecting the import of the Sullivan protections into
a securities fraud action).
12. Of note, this Article does not address whether the companion First Amendment doctrine that
statements of "pure opinion" are not actionable in defamation should also be incorporated into
securities fraud actions. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990). This author has
previously argued that statements of "pure opinion" as defined by First Amendment precedent in the
defamation context are not actionable as securities fraud because they are immaterial as a matter of law.
See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REv. 381, 437-46
(2013). Therefore, there is no need to incorporate this First Amendment doctrine into securities fraud
jurisprudence.
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This Article proceeds in five additional Parts. Part It demonstrates that
the Sullivan protections apply when a public company sues a
noncommercial speaker for defamation. In particular, this Part draws from
the policy rationales underlying the current First Amendment precedent to
argue that a public company qualifies as a public figure, that the Sullivan
protections apply equally to media and non-media defendants, and that
these protections apply only to noncommercial speech.
Part III demonstrates that a noncommercial speaker is potentially
exposed to liability in securities fraud for the very same speech that would
be protected under Sullivan and its progeny if sued in defamation. Because
of the breadth of speech encompassed by the "in connection with" element
of securities fraud, noncommercial speech is potentially actionable as
securities fraud. Yet, the securities fraud liability standards are lower than
the Sullivan protections because scienter can be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence and is subject to deferential appellate review.
Part IV argues that the "Sullivan balancing test," the structure that the
Sullivan Court applied to analyze the First Amendment overlay in
defamation actions, should likewise apply in securities fraud actions. In
particular, this Part shows that the Sullivan balancing test has been applied
to a variety of non-defamation causes of action that, like defamation,
implicate First Amendment concerns, and this Part argues that securities
fraud claims likewise merit First Amendment scrutiny. Finally, this Part
debunks the popular "truisms" that the First Amendment is inapplicable to
"fraud" claims and that the First Amendment is inapplicable to securities
regulation.
Part V applies the Sullivan balancing test to securities fraud claims,
recommending that the Sullivan protections should apply in securities fraud
cases based on noncommercial speech about public companies. Further,
this Part discusses how this Article's Recommendation serves important
policy goals in addition to those embodied in the First Amendment and
adds to the scholarly literature about the constitutionality of securities
regulation.
Finally, Part VI briefly concludes, calling upon litigants and other
scholars to continue to tackle the complicated question of the First
Amendment overlay on securities regulation.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS APPLY IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS
INVOLVING NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH ABOUT PUBLIC COMPANIES
This Part demonstrates that First Amendment protections likely apply
to defamation claims asserted by a public company against a
noncommercial speaker. In particular, the public company could not prevail
in the defamation suit without showing by "clear and convincing" evidence
2014]
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that the speaker acted with "actual malice." Moreover, an appellate court
reviewing the case would perform an "independent inquiry" into whether
the public company had made this requisite showing. This Article will refer
to this trio of protections (clear and convincing evidence, actual malice, and
independent inquiry) as "the Sullivan protections."
In order to demonstrate that the Sullivan protections apply when a
public company sues a noncommercial speaker for defamation, this Part
analyzes three issues that have not yet been decided by the Supreme Court:
(1) whether a public company qualifies as a "public figure" for purposes of
the Sullivan protections; (2) whether these protections apply equally to
media and non-media defendants; and (3) whether these protections are
limited to noncommercial speech. Drawing on the policy rationales
underlying the current First Amendment precedent, this Part concludes that
a public company qualifies as a public figure, that the Sullivan protections
apply equally to media and non-media defendants, and that these
protections apply only to noncommercial speech. Therefore, this Part
demonstrates that the clear and convincing evidence, actual malice, and
independent inquiry standards apply when a public company sues a
defendant, media or otherwise, for allegedly defamatory noncommercial
speech.
A. The Sullivan Protections Apply in Defamation Actions Asserted by
Public Figures
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech. 13 This constitutional protection
of speech furthers a number of goals fundamental to a free society. First, by
protecting the freedom of speech, the First Amendment ensures that the
public engages in spirited debate about topics of public importance,
including-but not limited to' 4-- political and social issues. 15 This open
interchange of divergent ideas permits members of society to make up their
own minds about these topics, which is essential to an effectively
functioning democracy. 16 This exchange of ideas operates like a
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("The guarantees for speech and press are not the
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy
government .... 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period."' (quoting Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940))).
15. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.").
16. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765
n. 19 (1976) ("This Court likewise has emphasized the role of the First Amendment in guaranteeing our
[Vol. 65:4:903
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marketplace, with ideas competing for allegiance by virtue of their merits.
17
Second, by protecting the freedom of speech, the First Amendment affords
individuals the ability to express themselves about political and social
issues,18 as well as "philosophical social, artistic, economic, literary, or
ethical matters," among others. 19 Self-expression and self-governance are
intrinsically related, and both are fundamental in a democratic society.20
Therefore, "as a general matter, 'the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.",'2' This prohibition on regulation of
content is not absolute, however. For example, obscenity can be regulated
without running afoul of the First Amendment.22 Similarly, defamation
regulation has long been recognized as permissible.23 That is not to say,
capacity for democratic self-government." (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964))); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("For speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments
embody our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."' (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270));
Associated Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("[The First] Amendment rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society.").
17. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."); Time, 385
U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("'The marketplace of ideas' where it
functions still remains the best testing ground for truth.").
18. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (plurality opinion) ("'Our form of government
is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and
association. This right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights."' (quoting Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957)) (plurality opinion)); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 270 (1941) ("[lI]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with
perfect good taste, on all public institutions." (footnote omitted)).
19. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (refusing to grant public workers
greater First Amendment rights than private workers in the collective bargaining context, despite public
unions' necessarily political activities) ("It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First
Amendment 'was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.' But our cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to
take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not entitled to full First Amendment protection." (citations
omitted)).
20. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) ("The First
Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual
liberty-and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality
of society as a whole."); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75 ("For speech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.").
21. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (quoting Police Dept. of Chi. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957).
23. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citing N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (listing "defamation" and "fraud" as among those categories of
expression in which content-based restrictions have historically and traditionally been permissible); id.
at 2561 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Laws prohibiting fraud, perjury, and defamation ... were in existence
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however, that all regulation of defamation is consistent with the First
Amendment.24 Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected that contention in the
seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither
precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet "libel"
than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. Like insurrection,
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other
formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged
in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.25
As Sullivan and its progeny have made clear, the First Amendment
limits the ability of "public officials" and "public figures" to recover for
defamation. In order to recover in a defamation action, a public official or
figure must show by clear and convincing 26 evidence that the speaker acted
with actual malice.27 Moreover, on appeal, judges have a "constitutional
when the First Amendment was adopted, and their constitutionality is now beyond question."); Bose,
466 U.S. at 504 ("Nevertheless, there are categories of communication and certain special utterances to
which the majestic protection of the First Amendment does not extend because they 'are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.' Libelous
speech has been held to constitute one such category; others that have been held to be outside the scope
of the freedom of speech are fighting words, incitement to riot, obscenity, and child pornography."
(citations omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))); Donaldson v.
Read Magazine, Inc. 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948) ("[T]he government's power to protect people against
fraud has always been recognized in this country and is firmly established." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
24. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
25. Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal citation omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
429 (1963) (plurality opinion)).
26. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) ("In sum, a court ruling on a
motion for summary judgment must be guided by the New York Times 'clear and convincing'
evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists-that is, whether
the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown with
convincing clarity."); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986) ("That [actual
malice] showing must be made with 'convincing clarity,' or, in a later formulation, by 'clear and
convincing proof."' (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86, and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 342 (1974))); Bose, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30 ("The burden of proving 'actual malice' requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his
statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement.");
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 ("Applying these standards, we consider that the proof presented to show
actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands, and hence that it
would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the proper rule of law.").
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 ("The New York Times standard defines the level of constitutional
protection appropriate to the context of defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason of the
notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are
properly classed as public figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to
2014] The First Amendment and Securities Fraud
responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact" to exercise
independent judgment to assess whether the record establishes actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence.28
A public official for purposes of the Sullivan standard is a government
employee, including the quintessential example of a politician. It remains
unsettled how low in the ranks this designation extends.29 Public figures for
purposes of the Sullivan standard achieve that status "by reason of the
notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they
seek the public's attention. 30  This classification is sub-divided between
unlimited public figures, who "occupy positions of such persuasive power
and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes," and
limited public figures, who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved."
31
The actual malice standard requires a showing that the defamatory
falsehood was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."32 The actual malice standard,
which is "largely a judge-made rule of law," 33 does not depend on the
speaker's bad motive or ill will.34 In addition, although the motive to earn a
profit from the speech is potentially relevant evidence, it is not sufficient to
establish actual malice.35
The trio of Sullivan protections-the actual malice standard, the clear
and convincing evidence standard, and the independent appellate review
reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth."); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 ("The constitutional
guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice'....").
28. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501, 514.
29. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23 ("We have no occasion here to determine how far down into
the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official' designation would extend for purposes of
this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included.").
30. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
31. Id. at 345.
32. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
33. Bose, 466 U.S. at 502.
34. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) ("Actual malice under the
New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a
motive arising from spite or ill will."); Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,
666 n.7 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with
bad motive or ill will.").
35. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667 ("Nor can the fact that the defendant published the defamatory
material in order to increase its profits suffice to prove actual malice. The allegedly defamatory
statements at issue in the New York Times case were themselves published as part of a paid
advertisement. If a profit motive could somehow strip communications of the otherwise available
constitutional protection, our cases from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than
empty vessels." (citation omitted)); id. at 668 ("[I]t cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or
care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.").
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requirement-is the result of a careful balance between the interests of the
state in imposing liability and the fundamental goals of the First
Amendment. In what this Article refers to as the Sullivan balancing test, the
Court weighed, on one side, the state's interest in imposing defamation
liability--"'the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them
by defamatory falsehood' "'36-against, o  the other side, the First
Amendment interest in encouraging free speech. These two interests are in
tension because heightened protection of speech-including by imposing
an "actual malice" standard-means that some harmed individuals will not
be able to recover damages for injury to their reputations.37
Applying the Sullivan balancing test, the Supreme Court has reasoned
that the interest in compensating individuals whose reputations are harmed
is weaker when the individuals are public officials or public figures rather
than private individuals. First, as the Court explained in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., public officials and public figures are more likely than private
individuals to have the power to restore their own reputations:
[W]e have no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation
plaintiffs. The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-
help-using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct
the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and
hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements [than] private individuals normally enjoy. Private
individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.
38
Second, unlike private individuals, most public officials and public figures
have voluntarily entered the public eye, thus assuming the risk of
defamation alongside the benefits of notoriety. 39 Third, because private
36. Masson, 501 U.S. at 516 (1991) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967) ("Were this a libel action,... the additional state interest in the protection of
the individual against damage to his reputation would be involved.").
37. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 ("Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.").
38. Id. at 344 (internal footnote omitted); see also Time, 385 U.S. at 391 ("Were this a libel
action, the distinction which has been suggested between the relative opportunities of the public official
and the private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane.").
39. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 ("[T]he communications media are entitled to act on the assumption
that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private
individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an 'influential role in ordering society.' He has
relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his good name, and consequently he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also
[Vol. 65:4903
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individuals are less likely to be the subject of frequent publicity, the
individuals themselves are likely to be more sensitive to negative coverage,
and the public is less likely to view the coverage of them with skepticism.
40
Therefore, the Court has recognized that the interest in compensating
public officials and figures for defamation is more vulnerable to
countervailing First Amendment considerations than the state's interest in
compensating private individuals for defamation.41
Under the Sullivan balancing test, the compensation interest is in
tension with the First Amendment goals of encouraging an "unfettered
interchange of ideas" and permitting personal expression.42 Defamatory
falsehoods are, by definition, false statements, which-in and of
themselves-further neither goal of the First Amendment.43 Yet, the
possibility of liability for defamatory falsehoods has a potential chilling
effect on truthful speech. In short, the potential for defamation liability
encourages self-censorship of speech that the First Amendment values.4 4
First, because erroneous statements are inevitable, a speaker may choose to
remain silent rather than inadvertently incur defamation liability.
4
more deserving of recovery." (citation omitted) (quoting Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in result))); Time, 385 U.S. at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[T]here is a vast difference in the state interest in protecting individuals like
Mr. Hill from irresponsibly prepared publicity and the state interest in similar protection for a public
official. In New York Times we acknowledged public officials to be a breed from whom hardiness to
exposure to charges, innuendoes, and criticisms might be demanded and who voluntarily assumed the
risk of such things by entry into the public arena. But Mr. Hill came to public attention through an
unfortunate circumstance not of his making rather than his voluntary actions and he can in no sense be
considered to have 'waived' any protection the State might justifiably afford him from irresponsible
publicity." (citation omitted)).
40. Time, 385 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Not being
inured to the vicissitudes ofjoumalistic scrutiny such an individual is more easily injured and his means
of self-defense are more limited. The public is less likely to view with normal skepticism what is
written about him because it is not accustomed to seeing his name in the press and expects only a
disinterested report.").
41. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
42. Id. at 269 ("The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is
secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard,
we have said, 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 [(1957)] .... '[]t
is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all
public institutions,' Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 [(1941)] .... (alteration in original)).
43. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) ("False statements of fact are
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and
they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech,
however persuasive or effective."). But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 ("The First Amendment requires that
we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.").
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 ("And punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions
recognize that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy
of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship.").
45. Id. ("Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is
nevertheless inevitable in free debate."); Time, 385 U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
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Moreover, a speaker may fear that he or she would be unable to prove the
truth of a statement in court and thus choose not to speak.46 Further,
especially when speech concerns a controversial issue, a speaker's reliance
on the jury to discern the truth may be of cold comfort. As explained by
Justice Harlan, "[I]n many areas which are at the center of public debate
'truth' is not a readily identifiable concept, and putting to the pre-existing
prejudices of a jury the determination of what is 'true' may effectively
institute a system of censorship. 'A7 Finally, if the speech were critical of
multiple persons, the speaker might be subject to a crushing succession of
lawsuits, compounding the chilling effect.48 Encouraging truthful speech-
especially if it is controversial or critical-is fundamental to the First
Amendment. This speech, by its very nature, expands the scope of ideas in
the marketplace. Moreover, this speech allows for personal expression of
unpopular ideas. Therefore, there is a countervailing First Amendment
interest in limiting liability for defamation in order to prevent the chilling
of valuable, truthful speech.
This First Amendment goal of preventing the chilling of truthful speech
is especially pronounced when the subject of that speech is a public official
or public figure.49 Speech about public officials is essential to allow the
public to exercise its democratic rights, including voting, in an informed
manner and to prevent official corruption.50 Speech about public figures is
dissenting in part) ("Two essential principles seem to underlie the Court's rejection of the mere falsity
criterion in New York Times. The first is the inevitability of some error in the situation presented in free
debate especially when abstract matters are under consideration.").
46. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 ("A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the
truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in
amount-leads to a comparable 'self-censorship.' ... [W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be
deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They
tend to make only statements which 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone."' (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))).
47. Time, 385 U.S. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278 ("And since there is no double-jeopardy limitation applicable to
civil lawsuits, this is not the only judgment that may be awarded against petitioners for the same
publication. Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear
and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which
the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive." (footnote omitted)).
49. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15 (1990) ("As Chief Justice Warren noted
in concurrence, 'Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons,
and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and
events is as crucial as it is in the case of "public officials."' (alteration in original) (quoting Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in result))); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) ("The public-official rule protects the paramount public interest in a
free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants.").
50. See D. Mark Jackson, Note, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPS:
Revisiting New York Times v. Sullivan, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 491, 516 (2001)
("First,... government functions best when it broadly allows for dissenting opinions, knowing that
some communications may be false. Second, those in the public arena, entrusted with power, require
greater accountability.").
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equally as important, especially as power has "become much more
organized in what we have commonly considered to be the private
sector."51 As explained by Chief Justice Warren, "[P]olicy determinations
which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are
now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards,
committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only
loosely connected with the Government. 52 Indeed, Justice Brennan went
so far as to suggest that the "public official/figure" designation is merely a
convenient proxy for the more fact-specific determination that a topic is of
public importance.53
Therefore, under the Sullivan balancing test, weighing the interest in
compensating public officials or figures for defamatory falsehoods against
the First Amendment's interest in preventing the chilling of truthful speech
about public officials or figures, the Supreme Court fashioned the "actual
malice" standard. Public officials and figures are not barred from
recovering in defamation, but their ability to do so is limited by the First
Amendment.54 A person speaking about public officials and figures has a
"breathing space" in which to speak because the speaker is protected from
liability unless he or she acted "with knowledge [of the statement's falsity]
or reckless disregard" for the truth.55
The "clear and convincing" evidence standard is a further tilt of this
balance away from the state's compensation interest in favor of the First
Amendment's interest in encouraging speech. As the plurality explained in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., in an ordinary civil lawsuit applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard, "'[W]e view it as no more serious
in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than
51. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
52. Id.
53. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 780-81 n.5 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The decision in Gertz is also susceptible of an alternative justification.
Speech allegedly defaming a private person will generally be far less likely to implicate matters of
public importance than will speech allegedly defaming public officials or public figures. In light of the
problems inherent in case-by-case judicial determination of what is in the public interest, the Court's
result could be explained as a decision that the cost of case-by-case evaluation could be avoided without
significant chilling of speech involving matters of public importance.").
54. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("Yet absolute protection for the
communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of
defamation."); Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 ("Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further
the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.").
55. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2563 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2553
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he Court emphasizes mens rea requirements that provide
'breathing room' for more valuable speech by reducing an honest speaker's fear that he may
accidentally incur liability for speaking."); see also Gary Anthony Paranzino, Note, The Future of Libel
Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 477, 480 (1986) ("Penalizing only subjectively culpable publishers
protects innocent mistakes and avoids chilling public debate of important issues.").
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for there to be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiffs favor."'' 56 In a
defamation suit, however, the risk of error has implications far beyond the
parties to the suit because it chills everyone's speech. 57 The "clear and
convincing" evidence standard protects speakers from erroneous verdicts,
thus preventing self-censorship.
Finally, the "independent review" standard recognizes the
constitutional importance of the "clear and convincing" evidence and
"actual malice" standards.58 The safety net of independent review affords a
speaker confidence that, even if the trier of fact were to be influenced by
prejudice, the "clear and convincing" evidence and "actual malice"
standards would be subject to a non-deferential review on appeal.59 This
independent appellate review "provides assurance that the foregoing
determinations will be made in a manner so as not to 'constitute a
forbidden intrusion of the field of free expression.,"
60
B. Public Companies Should Qualify as Public Figures
The Sullivan protections-the "actual malice," "clear and convincing"
evidence, and "independent appellate review"-apply only when the
subject of the defamatory falsehood is a "public official" or "public figure."
56. 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (plurality opinion) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
57. Id.
58. Harte-Hanks Commic'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-86 (1989) ("The question
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual
malice is a question of law. This rule is not simply premised on common-law tradition, but on the
unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard. Our profound national
commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law
of libel carve out an area of 'breathing space' so that protected speech is not discouraged." (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984) ("The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of
deciding concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage. It reflects a deeply
held conviction that judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such review in
order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution. The question
whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the convincing clarity required to strip the
utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as
expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported
by clear and convincing proof of 'actual malice."').
59. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 505 ("Providing triers of fact with a general description of the type of
communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to
narrow the category, nor served to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the
expression of protected ideas. The principle of viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First Amendment
itself also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is claimed that a particular
communication is unprotected." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); Paranzino, supra note 55, at 478
("[l]ndependent appellate review of actual malice determinations under Sullivan remains, at least for the
foreseeable future, the single most important guarantor of the press's [F]irst [A]mendment rights.").
60. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 499).
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If the defamation plaintiff is an entity, rather than a natural person, one
must determine when, if ever, an entity qualifies as a public figure.6'
Although lower courts have routinely extended these protections to those
who speak about entities,6 2 the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this
issue. 63 This Part agrees with the lower courts that entities can qualify as
public figures and further contends that public companies (and companies
that are in the process of going public) are per se public figures.
Each of the reasons for impinging on public figures' ability to recover
compensation for injury to reputation applies with at least equal force when
the figure is an entity rather than a natural person. First, with respect to the
importance of encouraging speech about public figures, entities are equally
as capable as individuals to be the subject of speech of public importance.64
As the recent financial crisis has shown, the conduct of entities-for
example, American International Group, Bear Steams, Countrywide
Financial, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Washington Mutual-has far-reaching
implications for the country as a whole.65 The holding in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission that "the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity" 66 only
heightens the importance of encouraging speech about entities, which are
increasingly powerful political forces.6 7 In the same way that speech about
61. It is unlikely that an entity plaintiff would qualify as a "public official." Although certain
entities might conceivably qualify as "public officials," such as the Federal Reserve Board or SIPC, it is
unlikely that one of these entities would seek redress via a defamation suit.
62. See, e.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 620 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that the Contemporary Mission, Inc. was a limited public figure); Nat'l Found. for Cancer
Research, Inc. v. Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, Inc., 705 F.2d 98, 101 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the National Foundation for Cancer Research, Inc. was a public figure); Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v.
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that Steaks Unlimited, Inc. was a limited public
figure); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that Reliance
Insurance Company was a public figure).
63. In Bose, the parties assumed that Bose Corporation qualified as a "public figure," and thus the
Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether a corporation's ability to recover in defamation could
be limited by these First Amendment protections. Bose, 466 U.S. at 513 (assuming without deciding
that Bose Corporation was a "public figure").
64. See Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine,
98 MINN. L. REv. 455, 456 (2013) ("Corporations no longer exist in a purely commercial world....
Like other public figures, corporations affect public affairs, take political positions, engage in matters of
public concern and controversy, and have reputations."); Patricia Nassif Fetzer, The Corporate
Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment "Public Figure ": Nailing the Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REv. 35,
63 (1982) ("With growth of corporate influence has come a greater resemblance to public sectors of
power.").
65. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xv-xxviii (Jan. 2011)
(presenting the commission's conclusions about the role these various entities played in causing the
financial crisis).
66. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
67. In fact, it would be somewhat unbalanced to reinstate the distinction between individuals and
entities in a context where the First Amendment operates to limit the rights of entities (such as in the
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public officials informs citizens' voting and prevents official corruption,
speech about entities informs citizens' consumer and investment decisions
68and prevents corporate corruption.
With respect to the countervailing interest in compensating entities for
damage to their reputations, entities are capable of protecting themselves to
the same degree as individuals by combatting negative speech with their
own speech.6 9 Indeed, entities have a protected First Amendment right to
engage in speech. 70 For example, although potentially subject to less
protection than noncommercial speech, commercial speech is not outside
the purview of the First Amendment. 71 Additionally, corporate political
speech is subject to First Amendment protection equal to that afforded to
individual political speech.72 Not only do entities have the right to engage
in speech, they are equally as likely as individuals to have the means to do
so. In the modem era, most entities have websites, if not Twitter accounts,
on which they can publish their own rebuttals. Moreover, just like
individuals with clout, a company can reach out to reporters or even buy
responsive advertising.73 Of course, the public may not believe the defamed
entity's defense, especially if the defamation relates to indicia of
context of recovering for defamation), while removing it in a context where the First Amendment
operates to expand the rights of entities (such as in the context of political speech). See Desai, supra
note 64, at 495 ("If corporations are afforded the same speech rights as and against individuals and
across all mediums, individuals should have the same rights against corporations.").
68. Jackson, supra note 50, at 520 ("Speech critical of corporations gives citizens key information
on goods and services and helps define consumer preferences. Moreover, consumer safety may depend
on an informed public. Finally, controlling corporate action [through] the product market depends on an
educated populace.").
69. Desai, supra note 64, at 469 ("Given corporations' concentrated wealth, newfound power to
create super PACs, and ability to employ sophisticated public relations and communications campaigns
either through in-house or hired companies, corporations can rival, if not exceed, the access many
human political figures can afford.").
70. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (citing twenty-two previous Supreme Court cases and noting
that "[t]he Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations"); Fetzer,
supra note 64, at 54 ("The Supreme Court has recognized a corporate right to 'speak out' on a range of
issues and has expanded first amendment protection of commercial speech. As a result, the corporation
now has increased and more meaningful access to channels of communication for rebutting defamatory
falsehood.").
71. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976) ("In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have not held
that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms.").
72. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
73. See, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 274 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[I]f it had so
desired, Steaks could have purchased additional advertising in order to respond to or seek to refute
Deaner's charges. Under these circumstances, Steaks does not have as compelling a claim for judicial
relief as it might, had it not possessed alternative means of challenging the defendants' allegations.").
But see Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff 39 ST. LoUis U. L.J.
1167, 1170 (1995) ("Not all companies, however, have the financial resources required to mount a
broad media campaign.").
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truthfulness, 74 but this problem applies equally to defamed entities and
defamed individuals.
Further, entities are just as likely as natural persons to have assumed
the risk of negative coverage. First, merely by creating themselves and
thereby reaping the benefits of formation, most entities have made a public
filing with the state of formation,75 thereby disclosing their registered
office, registered agent, nature and purpose, and--depending on the entity
formed-the identity of the incorporator, the general partner, the organizer,
or the initial manager.7 6 Moreover, entities ordinarily seek out the benefits
of notoriety to attract customers, investors, or donors.
77
Finally, entities-which by their very nature have a more limited
reputational interest than individuals because they do not have purely
personal reputations-may be less deserving of compensation for
reputational injury than individuals. 78 Therefore, the Sullivan protections
74. Redlich, supra note 73, at 1170 ("In many cases, those who hear the defamed corporation's
side of the story may not believe it. Ironically, the damage caused by the defamation may impair a
corporation's ability to effectively refute the falsehood .... ").
75. See Fetzer, supra note 64, at 63 (citing "the voluntariness of corporate formation" as a reason
why corporations may be public figures); Jackson, supra note 50, at 514 ("By taking the purposeful
action of operating under a state granted charter, the corporation knowingly assumes the risk of being
an object of public debate.").
76. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2011) (listing the contents required in the certification of
incorporation); REVISED UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 201 (2001) (listing the contents required in the
certificate of limited partnership); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 203 (1996) (listing the contents required
in the articles of organization). Sole proprietorships and partnerships, unlike other entities, can be
formed without a filing. See REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 202 (1997).
77. See Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 620 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing
the corporation's "over 12 million solicitations for its various mail-order products" as evidence
supporting its status as a limited public figure); Nat'l Found. for Cancer Research, Inc. v. Council of
Better Bus. Bureaus, Inc., 705 F.2d 98, 101 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he Foundation had thrust itself into the
public eye, not only though its massive solicitation efforts (almost 68 million pieces of direct mail
solicitation in the past three years), but also through the claims and comments it made in many of these
solicitations .... "); Steaks Unlimited, 623 F.2d at 274 ("In short, through its advertising blitz, Steaks
invited public attention, comment, and criticism.").
78. Fetzer, supra note 64, at 52-54 ("It is uniformly held that a corporation does not have a
private life or a purely personal reputation that may be defamed .... Hence .... there is more
justification for speech and press intrusion into corporate, as opposed to individual, affairs."); Jackson,
supra note 50, at 511 ("A corporation does not have social relationships and cannot suffer the same
emotions that a natural person may suffer. They do not have a private life. Nor do they have a purely
personal reputation." (footnotes omitted)); Keith A. Dotseth, Note, Redefining the Corporate
"Jellyfish ": Corporate Plaintiffs in Defamation Actions, 14 J. CORP. L. 907, 915 (1989) (noting that a
corporation is "a legally fictionalized person that does not possess the same reputational or emotional
interests as a natural person"). But see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262,
269 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (recognizing that a "corporation cannot have a reputation for chastity
but it can have a reputation for adhering to the moral standards of the community"); Bruno & Stillman,
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 590 (1st Cir. 1980) (disagreeing with the "assumption that
a corporation's interest in protecting its reputation is less important than that of an individual person"
because it "would suggest that any plaintiff, whether a corporation, unincorporated business, sole
proprietorship, or even a private individual, would have to meet the public figure's burden of proof
wherever the aspects of the plaintiffs reputation that was allegedly damaged were economic or
pecuniary, as opposed to personal").
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:4:903
should apply to defamation suits asserted by all public figures, whether
they are entities or individuals.
Public companies (including those that are in the process of going
public), which are a subset of the entities that could conceivably be
classified public figures, should be recognized as per se unlimited public
figures. 79 A "public company" has made a registered offering of its
securities, 80 registered its securities on a national exchange, 81 or distributed
its equity securities in such a way that there are now 2,000 accredited or
500 non-accredited holders of record.82 The importance of speech about
public companies is paramount because the financial health of public
companies-whose investors include retirees, pension funds, and parents
saving for college-has ripple effects throughout the economy.8 3 Indeed,
because there is such a strong public interest in speech about these
companies, all public companies must file in-depth, publicly available
periodic reports about themselves with the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
84
With respect to the state's countervailing interest in permitting public
companies to recover in defamation, these plaintiffs share the ability of
individual public figures to engage in self-help, thereby limiting their need
to resort to a defamation suit to obtain compensation. In fact, public
79. See Brown, 713 F.2d at 273 (Posner, J.) (dictum) ("[W]e observe in passing that if the
purpose of the public figure-private person dichotomy is to protect the privacy of individuals who do
not seek publicity or engage in activities that place them in the public eye, there seems no reason to
classify a large corporation as a private person."); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341,
1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("By its very nature as a large publicly held, govemment-regulated corporation,
and additionally because of its voluntary decision to make a public stock offering, Insurance has, in
fact, thrust itself into the public eye."); Fetzer, supra note 64, at 85 ("A corporation is also highly
susceptible to all-purpose public figure status. Large, public offering corporations are uniformly
vulnerable to this status .... "); see also Bruno & Stillman, 633 F.2d at 592 n.9 (contrasting the
privately held company at issue in that case with a "billion dollar, publicly held corporation, subject to
federal and state regulatory bodies, proposing a fifty million dollar stock offering").
80. Securities Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2012).
81. Securities Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2012); Securities Exchange Act
§ 12(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a), (b) (2012).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a); id. § 781(g)(1).
83. See Reliance Ins., 442 F. Supp. at 1349 ("We must acknowledge that the public interest is
well served by encouraging the free press to investigate and comment on business and corporate affairs
in the same manner as it would report on other public issues."). But see Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc,
Inc., 866 F.2d 681, 688 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We do not believe that the existence of an ongoing public
interest in the stability of society's financial institutions and markets ... elevates every member of the
regulated class to public figure status.").
84. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) ("[E]ach issuer which shall ... file a registration statement which has
become effective pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, shall file with the Commission, in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, such supplementary and periodic
information, documents, and reports as may be required pursuant to section 78m of this title .... "
(citation omitted)); SEC Rule 15d-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-1 (2014) (annual reports requirement); SEC
Rule 15d-1 1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-11 (2014) (current reports requirement); SEC Rule 15d-13, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15d- 13 (2014) (quarterly reports requirement).
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companies usually have public relations departments.8 5 In addition, like
individual public figures, public companies voluntarily reap the benefits of
notoriety, thus assuming the risk of being the subject of public criticism.
86
Among the benefits of "going public" are access to capital, liquidity, and
visibility. 87 Further, unlike limited public figures who have only "thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies, '8 8 public
companies must publicly file in-depth reports that cover virtually every
aspect of their businesses,8 9 including "[m]anagement's discussion and
analysis of financial condition and results of operations." 90 Therefore, it is
virtually impossible to imagine a scenario in which the subject matter of a
defamatory report would be sufficiently relevant to a public corporation's
business to harm its reputation while not being within the scope of the
company's comprehensive self-reporting.
91
Finally, treating public companies as public figures for all purposes
would promote predictability about how this class of defamation plaintiffs
will be categorized, which is essential to preventing self-censorship of
speech about public companies. 92 In fact, for this reason, one commentator
has suggested that all corporations, including those that are privately held,
should be treated as per se public figures.93 In light of the vast distinction
between a mom-and-pop corporation-which has not publicly solicited
investors, does not have the resources to defend itself in the media, and
does not implicate issues of public importance-and a public corporation-
which seeks public investors, has the ability to defend itself, and impacts
85. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
DUKE L.J. 855, 910 (2000) ("The corporation can also issue press releases to counteract any defamatory
statements, and many publicly held corporations can even finance intensive media campaigns to
rehabilitate a damaged corporate reputation.").
86. See id. at 911 ("Publicly held corporations must make an affirmative decision to 'take the
company public' in order to solicit money from investors."); see also Reliance Ins., 442 F. Supp. at
1348 ("Insurance was, at the time of the libel, offering to sell its stock to the public, thereby voluntarily
thrusting itself into the public arena, at least as to all issues affecting that proposed stock sale.").
87. Richard A. Mann, Michael O'Sullivan, Larry Robbins & Barry S. Roberts, Starting from
Scratch: A Lawyer's Guide to Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 840-41 (2004).
88. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see Jackson, supra note 50, at 505
(citing cases requiring "a nexus between the subject of [a corporation's] self-promotion and the subject
of the defamation suit").
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
90. Regulation S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2014).
91. See Lidsky, supra note 85, at 908-09 ("[I]t is fair to conclude that a corporation should be
treated as a public figure when the alleged defamation appears in a forum dedicated to discussion of the
corporation's management and operation and is reasonably related to that subject.").
92. See Jackson, supra note 50, at 508-09 ("A general rule, however, more appropriately governs
the interests at stake in corporate defamation cases .... Unpredictability means that litigants will not be
able to act in reliance on well-supported expectations.").
93. Id. at 522 ("A per se public figure status for the corporate plaintiff properly balances the
interests of reputation and speech.").
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the overall economy-this Article does not go so far.94 Instead, this Article
contends that entities can be public figures and that a subset of entities-
namely, public companies-are per se unlimited public figures.
C. The Sullivan Protections Should Apply Equally to Media and Non-
Media Defendants
This Article argues that the "actual malice," "clear and convincing
evidence," and "independent appellate review" standards should apply in
any defamation suit asserted by a public official or public figure, regardless
of whether the defendant is media or non-media. 95 Therefore, for example,
an independent securities analyst who publishes research about a public
company, although not a member of the traditional media, should be able to
rely on these protections to the same extent as a financial journalist who
publishes a comparable article.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the Sullivan
protections afforded a defendant in a public official or public figure
defamation case apply equally to media and non-media defendants.
96
Because the precedent in this area has arisen in the context of media
defendants (or non-media defendants whose speech was published in the
media),97 the Court's holdings are often stated as limited to media
defendants. 98 These holdings, which are merely narrowly tailored to the
94. Accord Long v. Cooper, 848 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that Long's
Electronics, a closely held corporation, was not a public figure, even though it was "successful and a
leader in its field"); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589 (1st Cir. 1980)
("We recognize the attraction of broad and clearcut definitions in terms of simplifying litigation, but we
cannot see how corporations as a class can be said to be 'public figures' for First Amendment
purposes."); cf Jackson, supra note 50, at 521 ("A per se public figure status is appropriate because it
functions well as a general rule. That a per se standard may work less well for smaller corporations may
be disagreeable in certain instances, but is nevertheless justified because of its value in most cases.").
95. Accord Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23-24 n.2 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("The defendant in the Hepps case was a major daily newspaper and, as the majority notes,
the Court declined to decide whether the rule it applied to the newspaper would also apply to a
nonmedia defendant. I continue to believe that 'such a distinction is irreconcilable with the fundamental
First Amendment principle that [t]he inherent worth of... speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of the source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual."' (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
96. Id. at 20 n.6 ("In Hepps the Court reserved judgment on cases involving nonmedia
defendants, and accordingly we do the same." (citation omitted)); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986) ("Nor need we consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a
nonmedia defendant ... ").
97. Katherine W. Pownell, Comment, Defamation and the Nonmedia Speaker, 41 FED. COMM.
L.J. 195, 197 (1989) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has applied these constitutional protections
"[iln cases in which media entities are not defendants, but serve as vehicles for nonmedia entities'
criticism of public officials or figures").
98. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 499 (1991) (in a case
involving a media defendant, limiting the rule to media defendants) ("The First Amendment protects
authors and journalists who write about public figures by requiring a plaintiff to prove that the
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facts before the Court, should not be interpreted as resolving the issue of
whether these protections apply to non-media defendants.
99
In a variety of other related First Amendment contexts, however, the
Supreme Court has declined to distinguish between media and non-media
defendants. First, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Building, Inc., a
splintered Court addressed the extent of First Amendment overlay in
defamation cases asserted by private persons. 100 Although the defendant at
issue in that case was Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.-a non-media credit reporting
agency-five Justices explicitly declined to rely on this distinction, stating
that the First Amendment affords media and non-media defendants
identical protections in defamation cases. 1 1 Second, more recently in
Citizens United v. FEC, the Court struck down a law prohibiting
corporations from using general treasury funds to engage in political
speech, even though the law included an exemption for the media: "'We
have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has
any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers."
0 2
defamatory statements were made with what we have called 'actual malice,' a term of art denoting
deliberate or reckless falsification." (emphasis added)); Hepps, 475 U.S. at 777 (in a case involving a
media defendant) ("[W]e hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot
stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern."
(emphasis added)).
99. Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward
Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 91, 119 (1987) ("The
repeated references in these cases to the freedom of speech clause justify the conclusion that 'media-
type' terms were employed in New York Times and Gertz simply because the cases involved media
defendants, and that the constitutional fault requirements enunciated in these cases should apply
regardless of the defendant's media or nonmedia status." (footnotes omitted)).
100. 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (plurality opinion) ("We conclude that permitting recovery of
presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of 'actual malice' does not
violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public
concern."); see also id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
101. See id. at 763 (plurality opinion) (not using the media/non-media defendant distinction to
resolve the case); id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (not explicitly addressing the
media/non-media defendant issue); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Wisely, in my
view, Justice Powell does not rest his application of a different rule here on a distinction drawn between
media and nonmedia defendants. On that issue, I agree with Justice Brennan that the First Amendment
gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom
of speech."); id. at 783-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Accordingly, at least six Members of this Court
(the four who join this opinion and Justice White and The Chief Justice) agree today that, in the context
of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those enjoyed by
other individuals or organizations engaged in the same activities."); see also 1 RODNEY SMOLLA,
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT: INTERNET, BROADCAST, AND PRINT § 6:48 (2d ed. 2012)
("[A]II the [J]ustices in Dun & Bradstreet either explicitly or implicitly rejected the media/nonmedia
distinction.").
102. 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 352 ("The media exemption [from the ban on
corporate expenditures for electioneering] discloses further difficulties with the law now under
consideration. There is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations
which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not.").
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This Article, consistent with the Court's refusal to distinguish between
media and non-media defendants in other First Amendment contexts,
argues that there is no distinction between these types of defendants in the
defamation context. Looking first at the First Amendment value of non-
media speech about public figures, non-media speakers perform an
informative function comparable to that of the traditional media,10 3
especially in the modem world of Internet speech.10 4 For example, financial
message boards "allow those interested in a particular corporation to gather
information that may not be supplied by traditional media outlets."1 °5
Moreover, the fear of defamation liability has the potential to chill non-
media speech to the same extent as media speech. In fact, the chilling effect
arguably is more acute for non-media defendants, who may be less likely to
be able to defend the suit, let alone pay the judgment. 
06
Turning to the countervailing interest in allowing injured plaintiffs to
recover from non-media defendants, the harm to reputation caused by non-
media speech would not exceed that caused by media speech-and, indeed,
non-media speech might be less harmful10 7 Additionally, one of the major
criticisms of the "actual malice" standard is that it replaces the chilling
effect of defamation liability with the chilling effect of a searching inquiry
into editorial processes. 0 8 This criticism is arguably less pointed when
103. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 773 n.4 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("And
this Court has made plain that the organized press has a monopoly neither on the First Amendment nor
on the ability to enlighten."); id. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Such a [media/non-media] distinction
is irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment principle that '[tihe inherent worth of...
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual."' (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978))); John J. Watkins & Charles W. Schwartz, Gertz and the Common Law of
Defamation: Of Fault, Nonmedia Defendants, and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 823,
849 (1984) ("It would indeed be a mistake to assume that contributions to the democratic dialogue can
come only from the institutional news media.").
104. See generally GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS: How MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY
EMPOWER ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BEAT BIG MEDIA, BIG GOVERNMENT, AND OTHER GOLIATHS 89-114
(2006) (discussing how Internet journalism by the masses is revolutionizing "Big Media" by scooping
it, correcting it, and supplementing it).
105. Lidsky, supra note 85, at 899.
106. Id. at 891 (arguing that the high cost of libel litigation is even more daunting for nonmedia
Intemet users, who "are unlikely to have enough money even to defend against a libel action").
107. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[I]t makes
no sense to give the most protection to those publishers who reach the most readers and therefore
pollute the channels of communication with the most misinformation and do the most damage to private
reputation."); Langvardt, supra note 99, at 122 ("Further, a false and defamatory statement published by
a media defendant has a greater potential for doing widespread harm to the plaintiffis reputation than
does the typical false and defamatory statement by the nonmedia defendant because of the broader
circulation the media defendant's statement would get.").
108. See, e.g., Dotseth, supra note 78, at 919-20 ("Prior to the advent of the constitutional
privilege, the media theoretically were chilled by the threat of large jury awards. Now, because the libel
suit inquires into whether the publisher exercised actual malice in its editorial process, the courts focus
directly on the exercise of editorial decisions. Fearing the chilling effect jury awards could have on
editorial decisions, the courts adopted a system that cuts to the chase--one that requires a heavy-handed
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applied to non-media defendants, whose editorial processes are historically
less sacrosanct than those of media defendants. Further, on a practical
level-in this modem era of Internet publications, 09  specialized
publications,110 and interplay between traditional and nontraditional
media" '-the attempt to distinguish between media and non-media speech
is itself anachronistic." 2 Finally, although this issue touches on the
unresolved debate about whether the Free Press Clause extends greater
protections to the press than afforded to the general public by the Free
Speech Clause," 3 that issue need not be resolved here. In this context, the
Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause likely afford coextensive
protection.!14
review of the editorial process.... [T]ruth and free debate are not encouraged by the constitutional
privilege system. Instead, truth and debate are casualties." (footnotes omitted)); Paranzino, supra note
55, at 495 (explaining that the "actual malice" standard has been criticized as undermining the
constitutional values that it is meant to protect because it allows "extensive discovery into the editorial
processes of publishers," which has its own chilling effect).
109. See Lidsky, supra note 85, at 889 n.174 ("To call [Internet posters] nonmedia defendants is
something of a misnomer, since the Internet is the ultimate medium of mass communication.").
110. See Langvardt, supra note 99, at 122 (recognizing the potential for "inconsistent outcomes
for sources such as specialized publications with a narrow audience, company newsletters, trade union
publications, credit reports, [and] handbills and brochures distributed by a group").
111. Pownell, supra note 97, at 210 ("The interrelationship between media and nonmedia speech
is an important factor that has been largely ignored .... Individual speech can be a prelude to media
speech.... More importantly, nonmedia speech often results from media speech.").
112. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) ("With the advent of the Internet and the
decline of print and broadcast media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to
comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred."); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at
782-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("First Amendment difficulties lurk in the definitional questions such
an approach would generate. And the distinction would likely be born an anachronism." (footnote
omitted)).
113. Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("And the notion which
follows from the dissent's view, that modem newspapers, since they are incorporated, have free-speech
rights only at the sufferance of Congress, boggles the mind."), and id. at 390-91 n.6 ("The dissent seeks
to avoid this conclusion ... by interpreting the Freedom of the Press Clause to refer to the institutional
press .... It is passing strange to interpret the phrase 'the freedom of speech, or of the press' to mean,
not everyone's right to speak or publish, but rather everyone's right to speak or the institutional press's
right to publish."' (citation omitted)), with id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's
strongest historical evidence all relates to the Framers' views on the press, yet while the Court tries to
sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause, the Free Press Clause provides a more natural textual
home. The text and history highlighted by our colleagues suggests why one type of corporation, those
that are part of the press, might be able to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why
some kinds of 'identity'-based distinctions might be permissible after all." (citations omitted)).
114. SMOLLA, supra note 101, § 6:48 ("The Court has thus not, for the most part, breathed life
into the Press Clause of the First Amendment but rather has treated it as rhetorical flourish that adds
nothing to protection for the press that it would not otherwise enjoy under the Speech Clause.");
Langvardt, supra note 99, at 121 ("Nothing would be taken away from the press under this approach.
Rather, there would be a recognition, at least with regard to defamation liability, that the constitutional
interests of media and nonmedia defendants are identical .... ); Watkins & Schwartz, supra note 103,
at 847-48 (suggesting that, in the defamation context, the speech clause and the press clause afford
identical protections to media and nonmedia defendants).
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D. The Sullivan Protections Should Apply Only to Noncommercial
Speech
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, this Article
agrees with most commentators and lower courts that the Sullivan
protections do not apply to "commercial speech." Under current Supreme
Court precedent, commercial speech, while no longer devoid of First
Amendment protection,115 is less deserving of First Amendment protection
than noncommercial speech.' 16 The resolution of whether the Sullivan
standards apply to commercial speech requires an analysis of two issues:
(1) where the dividing line between commercial and noncommercial speech
is located; and (2) whether the rationales for the Sullivan protections apply
to commercial speech as so defined. These two issues are interrelated
because the classification of speech as commercial is guided by whether the
rationales for First Amendment protection are implicated by the speech.
1. Commercial Speech "Merely Proposes a Commercial
Transaction"
The traditional definition of commercial speech is speech that "merely
proposes a commercial transaction."'1 17  Therefore, the quintessential
example of commercial speech is an advertisement for a product or
115. Compare Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
770 (1976) (holding that "commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected"), with Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) ("We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one
may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be
adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.... If the
respondent was attempting to use the streets of New York by distributing commercial advertising, the
prohibition of the code provision was lawfully invoked against his conduct.").
116. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) ("The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression."); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24 ("In
concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we have not held that it is
wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are commonsense differences between speech that
does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' and other varieties. Even if the differences do not
justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression by
the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired." (citation omitted)).
117. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) ("We have not discarded the
'common-sense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech."); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (in context of holding that commercial speech is entitled to some First
Amendment protection) ("Our question is whether speech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction' is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas' and from 'truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,'
that it lacks all protection." (citations omitted)).
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service. 118 As the Supreme Court explained in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, when a person engages in commercial speech, the speech is "an
essential but subordinate component."119 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, however, in addition to
citing the traditional definition of commercial speech, 120 the Court stated a
broader definition of commercial speech: "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.' 12 1 This broader
definition, on its face, would appear to expand the classification of
commercial speech to encompass a wide variety of speech that is
indisputably noncommercial, such as financial journalism.122 For this
reason, Professor Eugene Volokh noted that:
[T]his can't be right. Consider again the newspaper that discusses
business affairs, almost entirely in order to make money by helping
its readers do well in business. Consider a product review written
by its author because he wants to be paid, published by the
newspaper because it wants to keep its paying subscribers, and read
by readers because they want to know how to best spend their
money. Consider a union buying TV ads urging people to "Buy
American" because that's the best way of maintaining the viewers'
(and the union members') standard of living.
Such economic commentary, it seems to me, is as protected as
political, religious, social, or artistic commentary.
23
Indeed, subsequent to Central Hudson, the Court has reaffirmed the
traditional definition as the "core notion of commercial speech,"' 124 even on
one occasion referring to it as "the test.'
' 25
118. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 637 (1985) ("Whatever else the category of commercial speech may encompass, it must
include appellant's advertisements." (citation omitted)); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Commercial advertising constitutes
paradigmatic commercial speech under the Supreme Court's standard because its fundamental purpose
is to propose an economic transaction.").
119. 436 U.S. at 457.
120. See 447 U.S. at 562 (citing precedent for "'the "commonsense" distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction... and other varieties of speech' (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
455-56)); id. at 563 n.5 ("There is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection when such
statements are made only in the context of commercial transactions.").
121. Id. at 561.
122. See, e.g., Commodity Trend Serv., 149 F.3d at 684; Ginsburg v. Agora, Inc., 915 F. Supp.
733, 740 (D. Md. 1995); Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ'g, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 643 (D. Md.
1992); Lacoffv. Buena Vista Publ'g, Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d 183, 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
123. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of
a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1081-82 (2000).
124. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
125. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989) ("There is no
doubt that the AFS 'Tupperware parties' the students seek to hold 'propose a commercial transaction,'
2014]
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As further guidance on where to draw the admittedly imprecise line'2 6
between commercial and noncommercial speech, the Court in Bolger v.
Young Drug Products Corp. identified three characteristics that, if all were
present, would provide "strong support" for the characterization of the
speech as commercial: (1) whether the speech is an advertisement; (2)
whether the speech refers to a specific product; and (3) whether the speaker
had an economic motivation. 127 The Court cautioned that one should not,
however, draw a negative inference from the absence of one or more of
these characteristics. 
128
These three interrelated factors determine whether the speech was
primarily motivated by a financial interest in the goods or services
discussed. Therefore, on the one hand, even if the speech were not an
advertisement "in the classic sense," it would qualify if the primary
purpose of the speech was to encourage the purchase of the speaker's
goods or services. 29 On the other hand, even if the speech were run as an
advertisement in a media publication, it would not be commercial speech if
the speech was not intended to promote the purchase of the speaker's goods
or services.130 By the same token, the relevant "economic motivation" is
not whether the speaker was financially motivated to sell the speech 3 1 but
which is the test for identifying commercial speech." (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993) (noting that the Central Hudson test encompassed "a
somewhat larger category of commercial speech" and that the Court "did not, however, use that
definition" in Bolger or Fox).
126. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
637 (1985) ("More subject to doubt, perhaps, are the precise bounds of the category of expression that
may be termed commercial speech ... .
127. See 463 U.S. at 66-67.
128. Id. at 67 n.14 ("Nor do we mean to suggest that each of the characteristics present in this
case must necessarily be present in order for speech to be commercial.").
129. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 552 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Certainly the
repetition of the rumor via AmVox was not an advertisement in the classic sense, but whether it could
be considered as a negative advertisement against P&G seems to depend on the determination of the
third factor-whether the speaker had an economic motivation for the speech. If Haugen or others who
repeated this rumor did have economic motivations, then the message resembles an advertisement
seeking to encourage downline distributors to eschew P&G and buy Amway.").
130. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) ("The publication here was not a
'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial
support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public
interest and concern." (italics added to case name)); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d
1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that, even though the magazine identified the apparel products in its
altered photograph and listed them in a "shopper's guide," the photo did not rise to the level of "a
traditional advertisement printed merely for the purpose of selling a particular product").
131. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 789 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("Time and again we have made clear that speech loses none of its constitutional
protection 'even though it is carried in a form that is "sold" for profit."') (quoting Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 ("Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is
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whether the speaker was financially motivated to sell the goods or services
about which the speech was made.'
32
Finally, the Court's rationales for extending lesser First Amendment
protection to commercial speech than to noncommercial speech help guide
the classification of borderline speech as commercial or noncommercial.
133
If the speech in question does not need the greater First Amendment
protection afforded noncommercial speech, then it should be classified as
commercial speech. The following rationales are generally cited for
treating commercial speech to lesser First Amendment protections than
noncommercial speech: (1) commercial speech is more durable because the
speaker has an economic incentive to speak; 134 and (2) a commercial
speaker is speaking about itself and is thus uniquely situated to assess
truthfulness, making erroneous statements less inevitable 35 and making
corrective statements by third parties less feasible. 136 Therefore, if these
rationales are implicated, the speech should be classified as commercial.
,sold' for profit .... ); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 (differentiating "commercial advertising" that, under
then-current precedent, was not entitled to any First Amendment protection from protected speech)
("That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the
fact that newspapers and books are sold."); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 1998) ("A long line of Supreme Court cases, however,
confirms that speech does not become 'commercial' simply because it concerns economic subjects or is
sold for a profit.").
132. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 405 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("There is no evidence to show that Time, Inc., had any financial interest in the production or even
that the article was published as an advertisement. Thus the question whether a State may apply more
stringent limitations to the use of the personality in 'purely commercial advertising' is not before the
Court." (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942))); Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d
1007, 1017 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that the NFL had an economic interest in a video game promoted in
one of its programs because the licensing agreement gave the NFL "a direct financial interest in sales of
the video game"); Commodity Trend Serv., 149 F.3d at 685-86 ("The publications advertised in the
exhibits submitted by the CFTC do not appear to propose commercial transactions between CTS and
any customers. Rather, they appear to provide information on commodity trading in general and leave
any actual trading to other parties.").
133. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble, 242 F.3d at 550 (applying these rationales to the speech in
question in order to determine whether the speech was appropriately classified as commercial); U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 935 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
134. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980) ("Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content.... In addition,
commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that is not
'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."' (quoting Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977))); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 ("Also, commercial
speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial
profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.").
135. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 ("Two features of commercial speech permit regulation
of its content. First, commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their
products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of
the underlying activity.").
136. Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1223
(2012) ("Commercial speech is much less likely to be challenged by, critically responded to, or
corrected by third parties."); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the
Supreme Court's Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 433
Alabama Law Review
Applying the definition of commercial speech in the securities context,
three distinct categories emerge: (1) speech that is clearly commercial; (2)
speech that is clearly noncommercial; and (3) borderline speech whose
classification will depend on a detailed analysis of the facts and
circumstances. First, speech by the issuer about the issuer's business would
undoubtedly qualify as commercial speech. Thus, for example, issuer
statements in SEC filings like prospectuses and periodic reports would
qualify as commercial speech.13 7 This speech, which is made in order for
investors to assess whether to buy, hold, or sell the issuer's securities, falls
within the traditional definition of speech that merely "propos[es] a
commercial transaction."1 38 Moreover, most of this speech satisfies the
three Bolger characteristics because the issuer's speech is primarily
motivated by a financial interest in the securities discussed. The issuer has
an economic interest in the sale of its securities, both in order to raise
money and, in the after-market, in order to promote liquidity. Finally, the
rationales for extending lesser First Amendment protection to commercial
speech are implicated by an issuer's SEC filings. An issuer's SEC filings
are a durable form of speech. Not only are disclosures in the issuer's
interest in order to entice investors, the SEC mandates extensive
disclosures. Moreover, an issuer, who is making statements about itself and
has internal controls in place in order to audit the truthfulness of its public
disclosures, is less likely to make erroneous statements. Thus, an issuer's
disclosures about its securities constitute commercial speech, explaining
why the vast majority of securities regulations do not run afoul of the First
Amendment. 139
(2012) (arguing that commercial speech is especially prone to abuse "because the commercial speaker
always has more information about his products and services than the listener").
137. See Pomeranz, supra note 136, at 405 (identifying the Exchange Act's mandatory disclosure
requirements as an example of compulsory commercial speech); Volokh, supra note 123, at 1081
("Commercial advertisements for products or services are classic examples [of commercial speech]. So
are stock prospectuses, which propose the purchase of stock ... ").
138. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); see also Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
139. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 ("Numerous examples could be cited of communications that
are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about
securities .... Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to regulate
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity.");
Heyman, supra note 3, at 217 ("Concerns over extending [First Amendment] protections are tempered
by the fact that most securities regulations would survive First Amendment review under the
commercial speech doctrine."); Volokh, supra note 123, at 1081 (explaining that, because prospectuses
are commercial speech, "fairly heavy SEC regulation of speech in such prospectuses is largely
permissible, while similar SEC regulation of newsletters or newspapers that discuss stocks is not");
Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CoNN. L. REv. 265, 287 (1988) ("The
justification for this regulation of speech is the commercial speech doctrine. Modem constitutional
doctrine, although it gives some protection to that speech, appears to still permit prior restraint of
corporate prospectuses and registration statements that offer securities for sale."). But see BUTLER &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 103 (1995) (arguing that "the 1933 act should not only be subject to more
[Vol. 65:4:903
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On the other end of the spectrum, a financial journalist's article about
offered securities or their issuer would not qualify as commercial speech.
First, the journalist is not proposing a commercial transaction, any more so
than a movie or restaurant reviewer. 140 Moreover, the Bolger characteristics
are not satisfied because the speaker is not primarily motivated by a
financial interest in the goods or services discussed. Although an article
might focus on a company's products or securities, an independent
journalist has no economic interest in the sale of the covered securities.
Any economic interest of the journalist is in selling the journalism-not the
securities. Finally, the rationales for affording commercial speech less
protection are not implicated. A journalist, who risks being sued by the
covered company or the SEC, is the quintessential speaker subject to
chilling. Moreover, because the journalist is an outsider, erroneous
statements are inevitable. For these reasons, courts have held that financial
journalism does not constitute commercial speech.
141
Finally, securities analysts' reports and credit ratings fall somewhere in
the middle, necessitating an analysis of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the specific speech in question. Both securities analysts and
rating agencies are supposed to be independent, akin to financial
journalists. Yet, evidence has emerged that some analysts and credit rating
agencies are often so economically aligned with the issuer as to infect their
speech with bias. 42 Therefore, the classification of securities analysis and
credit ratings as commercial or noncommercial speech will depend on
whether the speaker in question is unduly aligned with the issuer-thereby
intense First Amendment scrutiny than ordinary advertising regulation, but is probably unconstitutional
even under the standard applied to advertising").
140. Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 149 F.3d 679, 686
(7th Cir. 1998) ("Just like a restaurant review does not propose a transaction between the individual
reader and the restaurant, the publications themselves do not propose any commodity transaction.").
141. See, e.g., Commodity Trend Serv., 149 F.3d at 684 (holding that various publications
providing impersonal advice about the commodity futures markets were noncommercial speech);
Ginsburg v. Agora, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 733, 739-40 (D. Md. 1995) ("(T]here is considerable
authority... for the proposition that investment newsletters are subject to the same protection under the
First Amendment as any other publication."); Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ'g, Inc., 793 F. Supp.
627, 644 (D. Md. 1992) (holding that a financial news analyst and editor's statements printed in the
newsletter Profitable Investing, and the promotional materials marketing the newsletter, were
noncommercial speech); Lacoffv. Buena Vista Publ'g, Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185, 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2000) (holding that a book entitled The Beardstown Ladies' Common-Sense Investment Guide was
noncommercial speech).
142. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 65, at xxv (concluding that "the failures of
credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction" and identifying "the
pressure from financial firms that paid for the ratings" and "the relentless drive for market share" as
forces leading to the credit rating agencies' failures); SEC, SEC FACT SHEET ON GLOBAL ANALYST
RESEARCH SETTLEMENTS (April 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm
(summarizing a series of structural reforms to prevent analysts from publishing conflicted research).
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rendering the speech akin to an advertisement-or is truly independent-
thereby rendering the speech akin to financial journalism.
1 43
If the analyst's or rating agency's compensation were linked to the
success of the offering, the report or credit rating would seem to do little
more than "propose a commercial transaction." In that circumstance, all
three Bolger characteristics would likely be satisfied because the speaker
would be primarily motivated by a financial interest in the securities
discussed. Moreover, the rationales for limiting First Amendment
protection would be implicated. This type of conflicted speech, like that of
the issuer itself, is more durable because of the direct economic incentive to
143. See Dodd-Frank Act § 931(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012), editor's note ("Because credit
rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical services on behalf of clients, much as other financial
'gatekeepers' do, the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally commercial in character and
should be subject to the same standards of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities
analysts, and investment bankers." (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010))); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 792 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Credit reports are not commercial
advertisements for a good or service or a proposal to buy or sell such a product. We have been
extremely chary about extending the 'commercial speech' doctrine beyond this narrowly circumscribed
category of advertising because often vitally important speech will be uttered to advance economic
interests and because the profit motive making such speech hardy dissipates rapidly when the speech is
not advertising."); Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106, 110 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2004) (refusing to afford First Amendment protections to a credit rating agency paid by the issuer)
("While the Rating Agencies gave 'opinions,' they did so as professionals being paid to provide their
opinions to a client. If a journalist wrote an article for a newspaper about the bonds, the First
Amendment would presumably apply. But if CFS hired that journalist to write a company report about
the bonds, a different standard would apply. Similarly, CFS and the Rating Agencies can be said to be
in privity through an agreement that both sides are entitled to enforce."); Gregory Hisisian, What
Standard of Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency
Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 410, 454-55 (1990) ("It is apparent, therefore, that bond ratings are
indeed the world's shortest editorials. As editorials, courts should grant them the same deference they
grant any other protected [F]irst [A]mendment publication. Ratings merely provide a simple means for
consumers to compare rough levels of risk among varying companies and industries."); Caleb Deats,
Note, Talk That Isn't Cheap: Does the First Amendment Protect Credit Rating Agencies' Faulty
Methodologies From Regulation?, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1818, 1850 (2010) ("[C]ourts should analyze
ratings as commercial speech. This approach is appropriate because (1) rating agencies rely on
confidential information in formulating their ratings; (2) rating agencies advise issuers on how to obtain
top ratings; (3) issuers include the resulting ratings in investments' informational memoranda and
selling documents; and (4) the commercial speech framework prioritizes listeners' interests in receiving
truthful information over speakers' interests in expressing opinions."); Jonathan W. Heggen, Note, Not
Always the World's Shortest Editorial: Why Credit-Rating-Agency Speech Is Sometimes Professional
Speech, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1766 (2011) ("Courts should not apply the actual-malice standard
whenever a CRA is a defendant; rather, courts should perform a functional analysis to determine what
role the CRA played. If the CRA played its traditional role and merely published an opinion, courts
should apply the actual-malice standard because the marketplace-of-ideas theory justifies First
Amendment protection. If the CRA played an active role in structuring the deal, however, its speech is
professional speech, and as such, the First Amendment does not protect it."); Theresa Nagy, Note,
Credit Rating Agencies .and the First Amendment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Protections to
Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 MiNN. L. REV. 140, 167 (2009) ("Although Moody's, S&P, and
Fitch have been successful in defending past suits using the First Amendment, courts should not ignore
the major differences between the rating agencies and the traditional press. The three major rating
agencies are paid by the issuers, take an active role in the structuring of transactions, and their ratings
are more akin to certifications than opinions.").
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speak. Moreover, the analyst's or rating agency's alignment with the issuer
would probably bring with it access to information, making it less likely
that the speaker would make an inadvertent error. Therefore, this type of
conflicted securities analysis or credit rating should be classified as
commercial speech.
If, on the other hand, the analyst's or rating agency's compensation
were independent of the success of the offering, the report or credit rating
should not fall within the scope of the definition of commercial speech.
1 44
The Bolger characteristics would not be satisfied because the speaker
would not be primarily motivated by a financial interest in the securities
discussed. The speaker's economic incentive would relate to the sale of its
speech, just like a financial journalist, rather than to whether the speech
accomplishes the sale of securities. Moreover, the rationales for treating
commercial speech to lesser First Amendment protection would not be
implicated. This speech, without the enhanced economic motive of
conflicted speech, would be subject to chilling, just like financial
journalism. Moreover, as independent third parties, these speakers would
inevitably make erroneous statements.
2. The Sullivan Protections Should Not Apply to Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Sullivan protections
apply to commercial speech, 145 but most lower courts to have addressed the
issue have declined to extend these protections to commercial speech.
146
This Article agrees with these lower courts that the Sullivan protections
should not apply to commercial speech because the balance of interests
underlying these protections does not apply to commercial speech. Under
Sullivan and its progeny, the state's interest in compensating public figures
144. See, e.g., Commodity Trend Serv., 149 F.3d at 684 (holding that a "hot picks" telephone
hotline, which provided impersonal trading recommendations about the commodity futures markets,
was noncommercial speech).
145. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 655 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari
as improvidently granted); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nike, 539 U.S. 654 (No. 02-575), 2002 WL
32101098 (presenting the question of whether First Amendment protections such as the Sullivan
protections apply to commercial speech).
146. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001) (dictum) ("When
speech is properly classified as commercial, a public figure plaintiff does not have to show that the
speaker acted with actual malice."); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 557 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that "false commercial speech cannot qualify for the heightened protection of the
First Amendment, so P&G is not required to show actual malice in proving its Lanham Act claim");
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 932 (3d Cir. 1990) ("We recognize
that the Supreme Court cases creating the commercial speech doctrine all involve some form of
government regulation of speech and that none involve defamation actions. Further, the focus in the
commercial speech cases is on First Amendment protection itself, not the heightened protection
afforded by the actual malice standard. However, we believe the subordinate valuation of commercial
speech is not confined to the government regulation line of cases.").
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for injury to reputation gives way somewhat because (1) erroneous
statements about public officials and figures are inevitable; (2) the potential
for liability has a chilling effect when erroneous statements are inevitable;
and (3) speech about public officials and figures is so important to society
that the liability standards should be raised in order to prevent this chilling
effect. When the speech is commercial, each of these rationales is lessened.
First, in most commercial speech, the speaker is speaking about itself
or its market, thus lessening the inevitability of erroneous statements.
147
Indeed, the quintessential example of commercial speech-an
advertisement of one's goods or services-involves speech by a company
about itself.148 Second, commercial speech is less likely to be chilled than
noncommercial speech. For one, because erroneous statements are less
inevitable, the risk of inadvertently incurring liability is lessened.
49
Moreover, commercial speakers have an economic incentive to promote
their goods and services. 150 As such, their speech is more durable.' 5'
147. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980) ("Two features of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First, commercial
speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated
to evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity."); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) ("The truth of
commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say,
news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate
information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more
about than anyone else.").
148. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 777-78 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("In contrast to the
press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy and sometimes conflicting
sources under the pressure of publication deadlines, the commercial advertiser generally knows the
product or service he seeks to sell and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual
representations before he disseminates them. The advertiser's access to the truth about his product and
its price substantially eliminates any danger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or
product advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression. There is, therefore,
little need to sanction 'some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."' (quoting Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974))).
149. See id. at 776 ("[T]he Court's decision calls into immediate question the constitutional
legitimacy of every state and federal law regulating false or deceptive advertising. I write separately to
explain why I think today's decision does not preclude such governmental regulation."); id. at 777-78
("The advertiser's access to the truth about his product and its price substantially eliminates any danger
that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill accurate and
nondeceptive commercial expression. There is, therefore, little need to sanction 'some falsehood in
order to protect speech that matters."' (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341)).
150. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 ("Two features of commercial speech permit regulation
of its content .... In addition, commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy
breed of expression that is not 'particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation."'
(quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977))).
151. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762-63 (1985)
(plurality opinion) ("In addition, the speech here, like advertising, is hardy and unlikely to be deterred
by incidental state regulation. It is solely motivated by the desire for profit, which, we have noted, is a
force less likely to be deterred than others. Arguably, the reporting here was also more objectively
verifiable than speech deserving of greater protection. In any case, the market provides a powerful
incentive to a credit reporting agency to be accurate, since false credit reporting is of no use to creditors.
Thus, any incremental 'chilling' effect of libel suits would be of decreased significance." (citations
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Finally, although self-interested speech about goods and services is of some
value to both the listener and the speaker, 52 it is generally of lesser value to
the listener than disinterested speech1 53 and less likely to be of expressive
value to the speaker. 154 Therefore, because the rationales for raising the
liability standards are less implicated in the context of commercial speech,
the state's interest in compensating for injury to reputation should not give
way when the speech in question is commercial as opposed to
noncommercial.
This Article's conclusion is buttressed by several hints from the
Supreme Court about the First Amendment protections afforded
commercial speech. First, in Sullivan, before setting forth the "actual
omitted)); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 ("Also, commercial speech may be more
durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little
likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.").
152. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 ("[W]e may assume that the advertiser's interest
is a purely economic one. That hardly disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment.");
id. at 763 ("As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate."); id. at 765 ("Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic
decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to
the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore,
even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public
decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal." (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
153. Id. at 779-80 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[T]here are important differences between
commercial price and product advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication on the
other. Ideological expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally related to the
exposition of thought-thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man ...
Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological expression because it is
confined to the promotion of specific goods or services. The First Amendment protects the
advertisement because of the 'information of potential interest and value' conveyed, rather than because
of any direct contribution to the interchange of ideas." (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1974))); id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that First
Amendment protections should not extend to commercial speech) ("It is undoubtedly arguable that
many people in the country regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as who may be elected to
local, state, or national political office, but that does not automatically bring information about
competing shampoos within the protection of the First Amendment."); Associated Press v. U.S. Tribune
Co., 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Truth and understanding are not wares like
peanuts or potatoes. And so, the incidence of restraints upon the promotion of truth through denial of
access to the basis for understanding calls into play considerations very different from comparable
restraints in a cooperative enterprise having merely a commercial aspect.").
154. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 997
(2009) ("[C]ommercial speech is not an exercise of freedom because market forces dictate its
content.... [C]ommercial speech is not an exercise of constitutionally protected freedom because of its
integral relation to market transactions that structurally involve exercises of power subject to state
regulation rather than embodying individual autonomy.").
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malice" standard, the Court rejected the argument that the speech in
question was commercial:
The second contention is that the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press are inapplicable here, at least so
far as the Times is concerned, because the allegedly libelous
statements were published as part of a paid, "commercial"
advertisement....
The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement in
the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen.155
The Court's clarification that the speech was not commercial suggests that,
if it had been, the Court would not have applied the "actual malice"
standard. 56 This suggestion is speculative, however, because when the
Court decided Sullivan, commercial speech was still afforded no First
Amendment protection. 157 Even if the Sullivan Court would not have
applied the "actual malice" standard to commercial speech, that does not
mean that the Court would not do so now that commercial speech is
entitled to at least some First Amendment protection.
Second, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court applied the "actual malice"
standard to a "false light" right of privacy statute. 158 Before doing so,
however, the Court carefully noted that, despite its narrow text, the statute
reached noncommercial speech:
The text of the statute appears to proscribe only... the
appropriation and use in advertising or to promote the sale of
goods, of another's name, portrait or picture without his consent.
An application of that limited scope would present different
questions of violation of the constitutional protections for speech
and press. 159
155. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (italics added to case name).
156. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 932-33 (3d Cir. 1990)
("[T]he New York Times decision indicated that the importance of the First Amendment interests in
defamation actions would be reduced in the commercial speech context.... While the Court ultimately
determined that the speech was properly characterized as an 'editorial' rather than a 'commercial'
advertisement and therefore deserving of constitutional protection, its analysis indicates that
commercial speech, in a libel suit, would receive some, albeit less than heightened, constitutional
protection." (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266)).
157. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("We are equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."),
overruled by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770 (holding that "commercial speech, like other
varieties, is protected").
158. 385 U.S. 374, 381 (1967).
159. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Valentine, 316 U.S. 52, and Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, with the
introductory signal "compare").
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This analysis, like that in Sullivan, suggests that, if the statute had been
confined to commercial speech, the Court would not have applied the
"actual malice" standard. The same caveat also applies, however. When
this case was decided, commercial speech was not afforded any First
Amendment protection, and thus this case's reasoning may no longer apply
now that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment.
Third, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, the Court finally extended First Amendment protection
to commercial speech, albeit a lesser protection. 60 The Court explained
that "the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech [] may
make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing
the speaker."' 16 1 Then, the Court cited Sullivan with the introductory signal
"compare. , 62 With this discussion, the Court suggested that, although
commercial speech was no longer devoid of First Amendment protection,
the Sullivan protections might not be necessary to prevent the chilling of
commercial speech.
Fourth, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n of New York, the Court set forth a four-part test to analyze
whether regulation of commercial speech violates the First Amendment.'
63
The first part of the test asks whether the speech is misleading.' 64 If the
commercial speech is misleading-as is all speech actionable in
defamation' 65-the regulation is per se constitutional under Central
Hudson. 66 In this context, at least, the Court is apparently unconcerned
with the potential chilling effect that regulation of misleading speech might
have on non-misleading commercial speech. The Central Hudson test does
not govern whether the First Amendment affords protection to commercial
speech in the defamation context because these are two different lines of
cases.' 67 By extension, however, the Court is apparently less concerned
160. 425 U.S. at 771.
161. Id. at 772 n.24 (asking readers to "compare" Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, with Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898 (1971)).
162. Id.
163. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) ("In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has
developed.").
164. Id. ("At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading.").
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) ("To create liability for defamation
there must be: (a) afalse and defamatory statement concerning another .. " (emphasis added)).
166. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is
based on the informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about
lawful activity." (citation omitted)).
167. See Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Pub'g, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 647 (D. Md. 1992)
("Applying the Central Hudson commercial speech test to defamation underscores an inherent
difficulty when these two lines of analysis are conflated. While defamation tolerates some false
20141
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about the chilling effect on commercial speech, whether that chilling effect
is caused by regulation or by potential defamation liability. 168
Finally, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the
Court held that the First Amendment did not restrict the damages that a
private plaintiff could recover in defamation when the speech did not
involve a matter of public concern. 169 Although the plurality did not
characterize the speech at issue as commercial, the plurality compared it to
commercial speech as an example of another kind of speech that is "less
central to the interests of the First Amendment than others., 170  By
extension, therefore, the Court suggested that the Sullivan protections
should not apply to commercial speech. 1
7 1
Therefore, consistent with the lower courts to have addressed this issue
and with these hints from the Supreme Court, this Article contends that the
Sullivan protections do not apply to commercial speech. Although this
Article's contention that the Sullivan protections are per se inapplicable to
commercial speech facially contradicts the compelling proposal of
statements, in order to give the First Amendment the 'breathing space' it requires, commercial speech
apparently does not forgive false speech so easily."); Q-Tone Broad. Co. v. Musicradio of Md., Inc.,
No. 93C-09-021-WTQ, 1995 WL 875438, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995) ("The United States
Supreme Court has articulated two distinct lines of cases addressing First Amendment jurisprudence.
One strain of cases involves defamation law and the other involves the government regulation of
commercial speech.").
168. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 548 (5th Cir. 2001) ("If
commercial speech receives less protection from government regulation, then it also should receive less
protection from private suits, which are not much more likely than are government regulation to
infringe on those values the First Amendment seeks to protect. Furthermore, private suits can be a form
of government regulation."); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 932
(3d Cir. 1990) ("We recognize that the Supreme Court cases creating the commercial speech doctrine
all involve some form of government regulation of speech and that none involve defamation actions.
Further, the focus in the commercial speech cases is on First Amendment protection itself, not the
heightened protection afforded by the actual malice standard. However, we believe the subordinate
valuation of commercial speech is not confined to the government regulation line of cases.").
169. 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 764 (Burger, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 774 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
170. Id. at 762 n.5 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion); id. at 763 n.8 ("We also do not hold, as
the dissent suggests we do that the report is subject to reduced constitutional protection because it
constitutes economic or commercial speech. We discuss such speech, along with advertising, only to
show how many of the same concerns that argue in favor of reduced constitutional protection in those
areas apply here as well." (citation omitted)); id. at 762-63 ("In addition, the speech here, like
advertising, is hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation. It is solely motivated by
the desire for profit, which, we have noted, is a force less likely to be deterred than others. Arguably,
the reporting here was also more objectively verifiable than speech deserving of greater protection. In
any case, the market provides a powerful incentive to a credit reporting agency to be accurate, since
false credit reporting is of no use to creditors. Thus, any incremental 'chilling' effect of libel suits
would be of decreased significance." (citations omitted)).
171. See U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 932 ("In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court held that speech on
matters of private concern, such as a credit report for business, receives less First Amendment
protection than speech on matters of public concern. More significantly for our purposes, the Court
justified its decision to allow less protection for speech of private concern by drawing an analogy to the
reduced First Amendment protection afforded commercial speech... (citation omitted)).
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Professor Alan Howard to apply a "relational framework" to deceptive
speech regulation rather than the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech, upon further analysis, the conflict is largely one of
terminology. Professor Howard contends that, when analyzing the
constitutionality of deceptive speech regulation, the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech should be rejected in favor of the
following nuanced relational framework, which would apply to all speech:
"(1) the extent to which the regulation impinges upon protected speech, (2)
the nature of the protected speech, and (3) the justification for protection in
terms of the relationship between the speaker and the listener, and the
allocation of the 'truth burden' between them."'7' This Article agrees with
Professor Howard that the analysis of deceptive speech regulation should
involve a nuanced analysis incorporating these considerations. Rather than
rejecting the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech,
however, this Article contends that the analysis of that distinction should
itself involve this nuanced inquiry. Only speech that does not implicate
these concerns should be categorized as commercial and thus outside the
reach of the Sullivan protections.
Applying this recommendation in the securities context, therefore, this
Article argues that the Sullivan protections should not apply if an issuer is
sued for defamation; should apply if a financial journalist is sued for
defamation of a public company; and might apply if a securities analyst or
credit rating agency is sued for defaming a public company, depending on
whether the analyst or agency were sufficiently independent from the issuer
to qualify as a noncommercial speaker.
III. THE SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY STANDARDS, AS APPLIED TO
NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH, ARE LOWER THAN THE SULLIVAN
PROTECTIONS
This Part establishes that noncommercial speakers are potentially
subject to securities fraud liability based on standards that are lower than
those imposed in the defamation context. As demonstrated in Part II of this
Article, the Sullivan protections apply if a noncommercial speaker is sued
for defamation by a public company. Namely, the plaintiff must prove
"actual malice," by "clear and convincing" evidence, subject to
"independent appellate review." In this Part, this Article demonstrates that
if the very same noncommercial speaker were sued in securities fraud for
the very same speech about public companies, the plaintiff would have a
172. Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the




lower burden of proof. In particular, although the securities fraud "scienter"
element is virtually identical to the actual malice standard, the plaintiff in a
securities fraud case need only prove scienter by a "preponderance of the
evidence," rather than by clear and convincing evidence. Further, this
scienter finding would be subject to deferential appellate review rather than
independent appellate review. In sum, therefore, a noncommercial speaker
is potentially exposed to liability in securities fraud for the very same
speech that would be protected under Sullivan and its progeny.
A. The Securities Fraud Statute Applies to Noncommercial Speech
Noncommercial speech is potentially within the reach of securities
fraud, as prohibited by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
1 Ob-5 promulgated thereunder. 173 The prohibition applies to any fraudulent
speech "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.
174
Recognizing that this is "ambiguous text,"'175 the Supreme Court has
broadly interpreted it, consistent with the securities fraud statute's
"catchall" role, 76  as merely requiring the fraud to "touch"'177  or
"coincide"'178 with the securities transaction.
The dominant "in connection with" test, which was first stated by the
Second Circuit, en banc, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., is whether the
speech would "cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in
connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a
corporation's securities."'179 According to the Fourth Circuit in SEC v.
Pirate Investor LLC, the core of this test is notice to potential defendants:
173. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1Ob-5 (2014); SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002) ("The scope of Rule 10b-5 is
coextensive with the coverage of § 10(b) ....").
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
175. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819.
176. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
177. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971).
178. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825.
179. 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
235 n.13 (1988) (in dicta, citing the Texas Gulf test); SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1262 (10th Cir.
2008) (applying the Texas Gulftest) ("[T]he SEC need only show that the documents are reasonably
calculated to influence investors, and that the misrepresentations are material to an investor's decision
to buy or sell the security."); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting
the Texas Gulf test in the context of information publicly disseminated into an efficient securities
market) ("[T]he Class may establish the 'in connection with' element simply by showing that the
misrepresentations in question were disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a reasonable
investor would rely, and that they were material when disseminated."); In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 150 F.3d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the Texas Gulf test) ("We hold, therefore, that
false advertisements in technical journals may be 'in connection with' a securities transaction if the
proof at trial establishes that the advertisements were used by market professionals in evaluating the
stock of the company."); SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying the
Texas Gulf test) ("Where the fraud alleged involves public dissemination in a document such as a press
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[A]ttaching liability under the securities laws for statements made
in any medium, no matter how tangentially related to the securities
markets, would run the risk of roping in speakers who had no idea
that their conduct might implicate Section 10(b). Thus, by
requiring that misstatements be communicated in a medium upon
which a reasonable investor would rely, the Texas Gulf standard
protects these unknowing speakers from liability and ensures that
there is a sufficient nexus between the misrepresentations and the
securities sales that they induce to satisfy the Supreme Court's
command that the fraud and securities sales "coincide."'1 80
As explained by the Ninth Circuit, the Texas Gulf test "strikes a reasonable
balance, applying liability under § 10(b) to those who make public
statements reasonably calculated to influence those who trade securities,
whether or not such persons actually trade securities.'
181
Included within the broad net of speakers on whose speech a
reasonable investor would rely are quintessential commercial speakers-
such as the issuer and its officers-and some noncommercial speakers-
such as securities analysts,182 credit rating agencies,18 3 and even financial
journalists. 184 For example, courts have held the following speech to be in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities:
A "Super Insider Tip Email" sent by a publisher of investment
newsletters, without any allegations that the publisher traded in the subject
securities or breached any fiduciary duties. 185
release, annual report, investment prospectus or other such document on which an investor would
presumably rely, the 'in connection with' requirement is generally met by proof of the means of
dissemination and the materiality of the misrepresentation or omission."); Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan
R. Bromberg, Rule lOb-5 's "In Connection With ": A Nexus for Securities Fraud, 57 BUs. LAW. 1,4, 24
(2001) (characterizing Texas GulfSuphur as the "leading" decision and its broad standard as "clearly
the predominant line of authority").
180. 580 F.3d 233, 250-51 (4th Cir. 2009).
181. McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Lowenfels &
Bromberg, supra note 179, at 24 ("Perhaps in the final analysis when one half of the equation is the
presence of fraud, it is not unacceptable for the other half of the equation, 'in connection with,' to tilt a
bit in the direction of coverage.").
182. See Swack v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 383 F. Supp. 2d 223, 247 (D. Mass. 2004) (denying a
motion to dismiss a putative securities fraud class action asserted by an investor in Razorfish against an
investment banking firm for allegedly false and misleading research reports about Razorfish and not
addressing the "in connection with" element because the defendants did not raise it in their motion to
dismiss the complaint).
183. See Genesee Cnty. Emps'. Ret. Sys. v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Trust 2006-3, 825 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1231-32 (D. N.M. 2011) (relying on authority under § 10(b) and holding that the comparable in
connection with element of the New Mexico Securities Act was satisfied with respect to credit rating
agencies).
184. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d at 253 ("[T]he text and purpose of § 10(b) admit of no
exclusion for 'disinterested publishers' of financial news and commentary ... .
185. Id. at 254-55.
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A press release issued by a business and financial consultant about a
proposed buy-out offer, where neither the consultant nor the proposed
acquirer traded in the target company's securities.
186
Analyst research reports, which were allegedly biased in favor of the
firm's investment banking clients. 187
Allegedly biased investment advice, disseminated online to paying
subscribers.
1 88
Indeed, in light of the potential breadth of the "in connection with"
element, media organizations often appear as amici curiae when the "in
connection with" element is litigated in order to argue that the element
should be interpreted more narrowly to take into account First Amendment
considerations.1 89 With few exceptions,19 ° courts have not been receptive to
this argument and continue to interpret the "in connection with" element
broadly enough to encompass noncommercial speakers. 19'
B. The Securities Fraud Liability Standards Are Lower Than The
Sullivan Protections
Although noncommercial speech about public companies is potentially
within the scope of the securities fraud statute, that speech is subject to
lower liability standards than mandated in defamation cases by Sullivan
and its progeny. The Sullivan actual malice standard is essentially identical
to the scienter element of securities fraud because both standards require a
186. SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1360-63 (9th Cir. 1993).
187. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 75, 89 (2006); Rowinski
v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 298 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2005). The "in connection with" element in
these cases arose in the context of Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act preemption, not § 10(b),
but this element is defined identically in both contexts. Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 86.
188. SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("The subscribers paid Defendants to
get advice on what stocks to purchase. Having paid Defendants for that advice, it was expected that the
subscribers acted on it.").
189. See, e.g., Brief for Forbes LLC et al. as Amici Curiae at *7-18, Pirate Investor LLC, 580
F.3d 233 (No. 08-1037), 2008 WL 2307442 (arguing that, because of the First Amendment
implications, "disinterested publishers and writers" should be excluded from the scope of § 10(b));
Letter Brief of Bloomberg News as Amicus Curiae at Part III, SEC v. Agora, Inc., No. MJG 03-1042,
2003 WL 23325424 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2003) ("The publication of news by a disinterested, bona fide
publisher concerning a publicly-held company or its securities-even if that news is erroneous--does
not satisfy the 'in connection with' requirement.").
190. See SEC v. Wall St. Pub'g Inst., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that the
representations of a bona fide publisher with a general and regular circulation are not "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of a security), rev'd on other grounds, 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum) (suggesting that
§ 10(b) did not reach publishing defendants who did not purchase or sell the securities at the time of the
article's publication, were not in collusion with those who did, and did not effect a manipulation for
their own financial gain).
191. See, e.g., Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d at 252-55 (refusing to incorporate a First
Amendment overlay on the broad interpretation of the "in connection with" element).
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showing of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity,192 but the burden of
proof and appellate review standard are lower in securities fraud cases than
under Sullivan and its progeny.
First, Sullivan requires actual malice to be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.193 In the securities fraud context, however, scienter
need merely be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 194 This
differential evidentiary burden, which is incorporated into the summary
judgment inquiry, 95 is potentially outcome-determinative.
196
192. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) ("Every Court of
Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter requirement by
showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly .. "); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (explaining that the "actual malice" standard requires a showing that the
defamatory falsehood was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not"); Reliance Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. at 1353 (dismissing both a libel claim and a
securities fraud claim asserted by Reliance Insurance Company against Barron's, premised on an article
critical of Reliance's proposed public offering of stock) ("We have already found that neither Dr.
Briloff nor Barron's acted with such reckless disregard for the truth. Therefore, for that reason alone,
plaintiff is unable to sustain a cause of action based on Rule lOb-5."). Indeed, the Court drew on
common-law fraud precedent when drafting the actual malice standard. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 & n.19 (1984) ("The earlier defamation cases, in turn, have a
kinship to English cases considering the kind of motivation that must be proved to support a common-
law action for deceit.... Under what has been characterized as the 'honest liar' formula, fraud could be
proved 'when it is shewn [sic] that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without
belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false."'); see also Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M.
Fairchild & Frank D'Souza, Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating Agencies A Good Idea?: Credit
Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 17 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 175,
219 (2012) ("It seems likely, however, that in the case of securities fraud if a plaintiff can prove
Ireckless or knowing' breaches of CRA defendant behavior, the plaintiff could prove the actual malice
needed to overcome the privilege. In such situations, plaintiffs would be successful under common-law
provisions, under current law, and the statutory provision just adds one more weapon in the already
existing arsenal.").
193. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) ("In sum, a court ruling on a
motion for summary judgment must be guided by the New York Times 'clear and convincing'
evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists-that is, whether
the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown with
convincing clarity."); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986) ("That [actual
malice] showing must be made with 'convincing clarity,' or, in a later formulation, by 'clear and
convincing proof.' (citation omitted)); Bose, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30 ("The burden of proving 'actual
malice' requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of
his statement.").
194. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 328-29 ("At trial, she must then prove her case by a 'preponderance
of the evidence.' Stated otherwise, she must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the
defendant acted with scienter.").
195. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-56 ("[W]here the factual dispute concerns actual malice, clearly
a material issue in a New York Times case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether
the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not.").
196. See, e.g., Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir.
2007) ("We nevertheless agree that Compuware has failed to produce sufficient evidence of actual
malice to withstand summary judgment, especially in light of the clear-and-convincing evidentiary
standard.").
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Second, under Sullivan, a finding of actual malice is subject to
independent appellate review.' 97 By contrast, in the securities fraud context,
a finding of scienter is subject to ordinary deferential appellate review.
1 98
The availability of independent appellate review in the defamation context
is often outcome-determinative, with one source calculating that "[u]sing
independent appellate review, the courts of appeals have reversed
approximately seventy percent of the libel judgments entered against
publishers."' 99 Therefore, the absence of independent appellate review in
the context of securities fraud is also potentially outcome-determinative.
Part III concludes, therefore, that noncommercial speech about public
companies potentially gives rise to securities fraud liability based on
standards that are lower than those imposed in the defamation context.
IV. THE SULLIVAN BALANCING TEST SHOULD APPLY TO SECURITIES
FRAUD CLAIMS BASED ON NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH ABOUT PUBLIC
COMPANIES
This Part argues that the "Sullivan balancing test," which the Sullivan
Court applied to analyze the First Amendment overlay on defamation
claims, should apply to analyze the First Amendment overlay on securities
fraud claims. First, this Part demonstrates that the Sullivan balancing test
has been applied to assess the First Amendment overlay on other non-
defamation causes of action. Second, this Part shows that securities fraud
liability, unlike some other types of civil liability, implicates First
Amendment concerns. Third, this Part argues that, despite authority for the
proposition that "fraud has no First Amendment value," securities fraud
claims nonetheless implicate the First Amendment. Finally, this Part argues
that the contention that securities regulation operates in a First
Amendment-free zone is unconvincing and inapplicable to this Article's
inquiry.
197. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501, 514 (explaining that judges have a "constitutional responsibility that
cannot be delegated to the trier of fact" to exercise independent judgment to assess whether the record
establishes actual malice by clear and convincing evidence).
198. See Baisden v. I'm Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 498 (5th Cir. 2012) ("Although we
review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we apply the same legal standard
as the district court. We will consider all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and
resolving all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." (citation
omitted)); EEOC v. Mgmt. Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 431 (7th Cir. 2012) ("We review
de novo the district court's denial of the Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Our
inquiry is limited to the question whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable
inferences permissibly drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed." (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
199. Paranzino, supra note 55, at 483 (citing authority).
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A. The Sullivan Balancing Test Applies to Non-Defamation Causes of
Action
The Supreme Court has on at least seven occasions subsequent to
Sullivan analyzed whether First Amendment protections like those in
Sullivan should apply to various causes of action that impose liability for
false speech, including claims for false light right of privacy and claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress premised on false speech.20 0 The
Court does not "blindly" incorporate the Sullivan protections into these
new causes of action.z1
Rather, each time, the Court applies the Sullivan balancing test to
weigh the interests that the particular cause of action implicates. In
particular, the Court first identifies the interests in favor of imposing
liability for the false speech. Second, the Court identifies the interests in
encouraging the identified type of speech. Third, the Court assesses the
degree to which the potential for liability has a chilling effect on the
speech. Finally, the Court balances these interests and determines whether
the Sullivan protections, or any other First Amendment protections, should
apply
202
200. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (analyzing whether the
Sullivan protections apply in intentional infliction of emotional distress claims asserted by public
figures and public officials and premised on false speech); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 768-69 (1986) (revisiting the degree to which First Amendment protections apply in defamation
actions brought by private plaintiffs); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 757 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (same); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343
(1974) (revisiting the degree to which First Amendment protections apply in defamation actions
asserted by private plaintiffs); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (analyzing whether the Sullivan protections apply in defamation actions brought by private
plaintiffs about matters of public concern); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (analyzing
whether the Sullivan protections apply in false light right of privacy actions applied to speech of public
interest); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) (analyzing whether the Sullivan protections
apply in criminal libel actions premised on speech about public officials).
201. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56 ("This is not merely a 'blind application' of the New York
Times standard, it reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate
'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." (citation omitted)); Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 49-50 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e adhere to the caution... against 'blind application' of the
New York Times standard."); Time, 385 U.S. at 390 ("We find applicable here the standard of knowing
or reckless falsehood, not through blind application of New York Times.. ., but only upon
consideration of the factors which arise in the particular context of the application of the New York
statute in cases involving private individuals.").
202. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 50, 56 (balancing "a State's interest in protecting public
figures from emotional distress" against "the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern" and holding that a public figure cannot recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the speech contains a false statement of
fact made with actual malice); Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768-69, 777 (balancing the interest in compensating
private plaintiffs against "the need to encourage debate on public issues" and holding that a private
plaintiff must prove the falsity of speech of public concern before recovering damages); Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757, 761 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (balancing "the State's interest in
compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in
protecting this type of expression" and holding that, when the speech does not involve matters of public
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Admittedly, applying the nuanced Sullivan balancing test on a cause-
of-action by cause-of-action basis-rather than applying a uniform liability
standard to all causes of action premised on false speech-makes this area
of law less predictable, at least in the near term, as the courts wrestle with
the application of this balancing test in various contexts. Indeed, as
Professor Christopher P. Guzelian has argued, in favor of a uniform
"predictable negligence" standard, predictable liability for false speech is
essential to upholding the Rule of Law.20 3 Yet, applying a one-size-fits-all
standard ignores the very different interests implicated by various causes of
action. Therefore, this Article argues that the costs of this short-term
instability are outweighed by the benefits of a more nuanced, cause-of-
action-specific First Amendment overlay. Indeed, perhaps the Sullivan
balancing test supports a predictable negligence standard in some contexts
and an actual malice standard in others.
B. Securities Fraud Liability Implicates First Amendment Concerns
Under Supreme Court precedent, some types of civil liability implicate
First Amendment concerns, while others do not. At one extreme, under
Sullivan, the First Amendment is an overlay on the elements of defamation,
protecting speech by heightening the liability standards.20 4 At the other
extreme, under Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the First Amendment does not
prohibit a source from recovering in promissory estoppel from a publisher
interest, a private plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages even absent a showing of actual
malice); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, 348 (balancing "the legitimate state interest in compensating private
individuals for wrongful injury to reputation" against the "need to avoid self-censorship" and holding
that, although the Sullivan protections do not apply in defamation cases asserted by private plaintiffs,
states cannot impose liability without fault and may not award more than actual damages absent a
showing of actual malice); Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 49-50 (plurality opinion) (balancing "society's
interest in protecting individual reputation" against "the vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom
of speech" and holding that the Sullivan protections apply in defamation cases asserted by private
plaintiffs about speech of public interest); Time, 385 U.S. at 384 n.9, 389 (balancing "a grave hazard of
discouraging the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees" about matters of public interest
against "the mental distress from having been exposed to public view" and holding that the New York
Times protections apply in false light right of privacy actions about matters of public interest);
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67, 74 (holding that, because there is "no merit in the argument that criminal libel
statutes serve interests distinct from those secured by civil libel laws," the reasons underlying the
balance struck in New York Times "apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal").
203. Christopher P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. REV. 669, 718 (2010) ("But
predictable liability-the sole means to upholding the Rule of Law-is a concept far older than the
Constitution, and one with which the Constitution, properly interpreted, surely does not interfere. What
we simply cannot afford to lose sight of in all of this is that the problem of false speech is quite real and
has been immeasurably enabled by the proliferation of communication technologies. It must be
addressed, and it must be addressed predictably. Formal, predictable liability for false scientific speech
is a first step in remedying the currently unpredictable state of First Amendment affairs."); id. at 705
("False-speech liability, therefore, should be associated with predictable negligence, rather than with
strict liability or actual malice standards.").
204. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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that breaches a promise to keep the source's identity confidential. °5
Professors Daniel J. Solove and Neil M. Richards go so far as to contend
that these "two opposing rules for determining when the First Amendment
applies to civil liability are on a collision course. 20 6
Courts and scholars have applied a number of different tests to
differentiate civil liability that implicates the First Amendment from civil
liability that does not.207 This Article adds to the literature by identifying an
additional distinction that is consistent with the case law to date and that
helps guide whether a civil cause of action should be analyzed under the
Sullivan balancing test. Regardless of the test applied, however, securities
fraud liability is subject to First Amendment review.
As one test, the Supreme Court has suggested that "laws of general
applicability," which "affect[] speech and non-speech activity in a neutral
way, 20 8 do not require First Amendment scrutiny. 209 As examples of laws
of general applicability, the Court cited laws against breaking and entering,
the obligation to respond to a grand jury subpoena, the copyright laws, the
National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the antitrust
laws, and the requirement to pay nondiscriminatory taxes.210 Securities
fraud, which is premised on allegedly deceptive statements or conduct,21'
always implicates speech activity and thus is not a law of general
applicability. Therefore, under this test, securities fraud liability implicates
First Amendment concerns.
As another well-received test, Professor Eugene Volokh, among others,
has argued that one test is whether the speaker has expressly or impliedly
contracted away the right to free speech, with a confidentiality agreement
as an example.21 2 In the securities fraud context, the noncommercial
205. 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991).
206. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 1650, 1672 (2009).
207. See id. at 1673-85 (identifying approaches that courts and scholars have applied to
determine when and how the First Amendment applies to civil liability).
208. Id. at 1673.
209. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669 (addressing whether the First Amendment barred an informant
for suing a newspaper for truthfully disclosing his identity, in violation of a promise of confidentiality)
("[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.").
210. Id. at 669-70.
211. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158-59 (2008)
(clarifying that securities fraud liability can be premised on deceptive statements or deceptive conduct,
as long as the deception is communicated to investors).
212. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671 ("The parties themselves, as in this case, determine the scope of
their legal obligations, and any restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truthful information
are self-imposed."); Solove & Richards, supra note 206, at 1675-77 (summarizing the consensual
waiver approach and identifying Professor Volokh as one of its proponents); Volokh, supra note 123, at
1057 ("I think that ultimately the free speech right must turn on the rights of the speakers, and that it's
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speaker whose speech is potentially subject to securities fraud liability has
not consented to waive First Amendment protection, let alone entered into
a contract to do so. Therefore, under this test, securities fraud liability
implicates the First Amendment.
As another compelling test, Professors Daniel J. Solove and Neil M.
Richards recently argued that the First Amendment is implicated only if the
civil liability enforces government-defined duties (such as in the context of
defamation) as opposed to non-government-defined duties (such as in the
context of nondisclosure agreements between private parties).213 Securities
fraud is premised on a statutorily imposed duty not to make
misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.1 4
Therefore, under this test, First Amendment protections potentially apply to
securities fraud liability because it enforces a government-defined duty.
Finally, this Article adds to the literature in this area by identifying
another key distinction that separates the Sullivan line of cases, to which
the Sullivan balancing test applies, from other lines of cases analyzing the
potential First Amendment overlay on civil liability: liability in the Sullivan
line of cases is premised on false speech.215 The Court has applied the
Sullivan balancing test to determine whether the First Amendment requires
heightened liability standards in cases alleging defamation, false light right
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress premised on an
allegedly false publication.21 6 Each of these claims is premised on an
allegedly false statement. By contrast, the cases following Cowles, which
hold that the First Amendment is largely inapplicable to claims of general
applicability, are all premised on truthful speech. In particular, the Court
has rejected the applicability of the First Amendment in cases alleging
violation of a promise to keep a source's identity confidential, the
obligation to respond to a grand jury subpoena, the copyright laws, the
proper to let speakers contract away their rights .... And such protection ought not be limited to
express contracts, but should also cover implied contracts .....
213. Solove & Richards, supra note 206, at 1686-97.
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
215. See Guzelian, supra note 203, at 681 ("Defamation is a fascinating speech tort. Besides
being the most constitutionalized, it belongs to a class of speech torts called the false speech torts (e.g.
defamation, fraud, false advertising, false light, or some fear or emotional distress lawsuits). Because
the question of a speech's falsity or truthfulness arises commonly in speech torts, it is a core question in
First Amendment cases.").
216. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims asserted by public figures and public officials and premised on false speech); Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986) (defamation actions brought by private
plaintiffs); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (same); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs about matters of public concern); Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (false light right of privacy); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
67 (1964) (criminal libel).
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National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the antitrust
laws, the requirement to pay nondiscriminatory taxes,21 7 and the
appropriation of publicity value by broadcasting a performer's act.218 None
of these claims is premised on allegedly false speech. Additionally, a third
line of cases, which applies strict scrutiny to civil liability imposed on
newspapers for publishing truthful information about matters of public
significance, is similarly premised on truthful speech. 219 Therefore, these
three lines of cases suggest that the imposition of liability for false speech
is a prerequisite to the applicability of the Sullivan balancing test. Indeed,
the Sullivan balancing test, which pivots on the tension caused by the
chilling effect of liability for false speech, is nonsensical where the subject
speech is truthful. Moreover, the Sullivan protections, which center on
proof that the speaker acted with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity
of his or her statement, are only relevant in the context of allegedly false
speech. Therefore, to the extent that the issue is whether to impose
Sullivan-like protections (such as a mandatory mental state subject to a
heightened standard of proof and a more searching appellate review) in a
civil cause of action, the cause of action must be premised on false speech.
Applying this distinction, securities fraud liability falls within the Sullivan
line of cases because falsity is a prerequisite to liability.
221
In sum, regardless of the test applied to differentiate between the
Sullivan line of cases and the Cowles line of cases, securities fraud liability
falls within the Sullivan line of cases, potentially implicating First
Amendment protections. Of course, the First Amendment does not
necessarily thereby alter the current securities fraud liability scheme.
Rather, securities fraud liability-like defamation liability, false light right
of privacy liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress liability
premised on a false statement-is subject to First Amendment scrutiny
under the Sullivan balancing test.
217. , See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665, 669-70 (reviewing precedent).
218. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977) ("Wherever the line
in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not,
we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. The Constitution no more prevents a State from
requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television than it would
privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner.").
219. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989).
220. See SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292-93 (D. Utah 2010)
(discussing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574-75) ("Importantly, that case [Zacchini] did not involve an
allegedly wrongful statement.").
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (premising liability on the usage of "any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance").
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C. The First Amendment Is Applicable to "Fraud" Claims
Before applying the Sullivan balancing test to analyze whether the First
Amendment mandates any changes to the securities fraud liability scheme,
this Article must counter the additional argument, asserted by several
courts and commentators, that the First Amendment is per se inapplicable
to "fraud" claims. Indeed, for this reason, the Fourth Circuit rejected an
argument, very similar to the assertion in this Article, that the Sullivan
protections should apply to a securities fraud claim asserted against the
publisher of an investment tip email and special report:
[I]n this case Appellants argue that the district court should have
found that the Super Insider Tip E-mail and USEC Special Report
were entitled to the heightened protections for expression that the
Supreme Court recognized in New York Times ....
We cannot agree with Appellants. Punishing fraud, whether it
be common law fraud or securities fraud, simply does not violate
the First Amendment.... The Supreme Court has stated the
principle almost as directly: "[T]he First Amendment does not
shield fraud." Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs.,
Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 123 S.Ct. 1829, 155 L.Ed.2d 793 (2003).
Of course, the government cannot label certain speech as
fraudulent so as to deprive it of its constitutional protections, id. at
617, 123 S.Ct. 1829, but we need not worry about such strategic
labeling here because § 10(b) clearly forbids actual fraud. Thus,
Appellants' First Amendment argument fails.
222
Several other courts have similarly ruled that the First Amendment is
anathema to fraud claims.223
This Article contends that the First Amendment is potentially
applicable to fraud claims.224 The courts imposing a per se rule that the
First Amendment is inapplicable to claims of fraud are incorrect because
(1) they misunderstand the purpose of the Sullivan protections; (2) they
misread Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc. ;225 and (3)
222. SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).
223. See, e.g., Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 233 F.3d
981, 993 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Section 6o(l)(A) and Regulation 4.41(a)(1) require scienter and do no more
than prohibit common law fraud in commodities transactions. Explicit antifraud measures such as these
do not violate the First Amendment.").
224. Accord La Luna Enters., Inc. v. CBS Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(dismissing the plaintiffs fraud claim) ("Nevertheless, where a plaintiff brings a tort claim other than
defamation to impose liability on the press for the publication of allegedly false and harmful statements,
these claims may be subject to the strictures of the First Amendment.").
225. 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
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they are inconsistent with recent Supreme Court precedent affording First
Amendment protections even to false speech.
First, these courts misunderstand the point of potentially applying the
Sullivan protections in securities fraud cases, and thus their reliance on the
proposition that fraudulent speech is devoid of First Amendment protection
is inapposite. As proposed in this Article, the Sullivan protections are not
meant to protect "fraudulent" speech, which has little-if any-First
Amendment value. Rather, these protections are meant to prevent the
chilling of non-fraudulent speech, which has First Amendment value.
Indeed, when adopting the Sullivan protections, the Supreme Court, in the
context of defamation, rejected an argument very similar to the one
asserted by these courts. Just as there is a line of cases stating that
fraudulent speech has no First Amendment value, there is a line of cases
stating that defamatory speech has no First Amendment value. Yet, the
Court adopted the Sullivan protections-not to protect low-value
defamatory speech-but to prevent the chilling of valuable non-defamatory
speech:
Nevertheless, there are categories of communication and certain
special utterances to which the majestic protection of the First
Amendment does not extend because they "are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category;
others that have been held to be outside the scope of the freedom of
speech are fighting words, incitement to riot, obscenity, and child
pornography. In each of these areas, the limits of the unprotected
category, as well as the unprotected character of particular
communications, have been determined by the judicial evaluation
of special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional
significance. In such cases, the Court has regularly conducted an
independent review of the record both to be sure that the speech in
question actually falls within the unprotected category and to
confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within
acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected
expression will not be inhibited.226
226. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 (1984) (internal
footnote omitted) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 n.3 (1964) ("In affirming appellant's
conviction, before New York Times was handed down, the Supreme Court of Louisiana relied on
statements in Roth v. United States and Beauhamais v. Illinois to the effect that libelous utterances are
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In other words, the protection of some low-value speech, whether it be
defamatory or fraudulent, is necessary to prevent the chilling of valuable
speech.227
Second, these courts misinterpret Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 22  a case that actually lends support for
applying the Sullivan protections to fraud claims. In Madigan, the Supreme
Court held that the imposition of fraud liability on charitable donations
fundraisers did not violate the First Amendment. First, unsurprisingly, the
Court classified fraudulent charitable solicitation as unprotected speech.229
The Court's analysis did not stop there, however. Rather, the Court then
considered whether the bounds of fraud liability were appropriately drawn
so as not to chill non-fraudulent charitable solicitation: "Of prime
importance, and in contrast to a prior restraint on solicitation, or a
regulation that imposes on fundraisers an uphill burden to prove their
conduct lawful, in a properly tailored fraud action the State bears the full
burden of proof. False statement alone does not subject a fundraiser to
fraud liability. '230 And, the Court specifically recognized that the Illinois
statute afforded defendants protections similar to those afforded by Sullivan
and its progeny:
As restated in Illinois case law, to prove a defendant liable for
fraud, the complainant must show that the defendant made a false
representation of a material fact knowing that the representation
was false; further, the complainant must demonstrate that the
defendant made the representation with the intent to mislead the
not within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and hence can be punished without a
showing of clear and present danger. For the reasons stated in New York Times, nothing in Roth or
Beauharnais forecloses inquiry into whether the use of libel laws, civil or criminal, to impose sanctions
upon criticism of the official conduct of public officials transgresses constitutional limitations
protecting freedom of expression. Whether the libel law be civil or criminal, it must satisfy relevant
constitutional standards." (citations omitted)); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)
("In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other 'mere labels' of state law. Like insurrection,
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and
the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel
can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment." (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963))); id. at 268
("Respondent relies heavily, as did the Alabama courts, on statements of this Court to the effect that the
Constitution does not protect libelous publications. Those statements do not foreclose our inquiry here.
None of the cases sustained the use of libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the
official conduct of public officials." (footnotes omitted)).
227. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ("The First Amendment requires
that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.").
228. Madigan, 538 U.S. at 612.
229. Id. at 612 ("The First Amendment protects the right to engage in charitable solicitation....
But the First Amendment does not shield fraud.... Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent
charitable solicitation is unprotected speech." (citations omitted)).
230. Id. at 620.
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listener, and succeeded in doing so. Heightening the complainant's
burden, these showings must be made by clear and convincing
evidence.
Exacting proof requirements of this order, in other contexts,
have been held to provide sufficient breathing room for protected
speech. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-
80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (action for defamation of
public official); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502, and n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502
(1984) (noting "kinship" between New York Times standard and
"motivation that must be proved to support a common-law action
for deceit"). As an additional safeguard responsive to First
Amendment concerns, an appellate court could independently
review the trial court's findings. Cf. Bose Corp., 466 U.S., at 498-
511, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (de novo appellate review of findings
regarding actual malice).231
Therefore, while Madigan stands for the proposition that fraud liability can
be consistent with the First Amendment, it does not stand for the
proposition that all fraud liability is consistent with the First Amendment.
Rather, the fraud liability provision at issue must afford sufficient breathing
room for protected speech.232 Further, the Court suggested that the Sullivan
protections, which afford the requisite breathing room in the context of
defamation, might also be necessary in the context of fraud.
Finally, these courts' holdings fail to anticipate the Supreme Court's
recent suggestion that, in some contexts, false speech might itself have
independent value worthy of First Amendment protection. In United States
v. Alvarez, the Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized
false claims about receipt of military decorations or medals, because it
violated the First Amendment.233 In the plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy
rejected the notion that false speech is per se devoid of First Amendment
231. Id. at 620-21 (internal footnote omitted) (some internal citations omitted).
232. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)
("Even when considering some instances of defamation and fraud, moreover, the Court has been careful
to instruct that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment. The
statement must be a knowing or reckless falsehood."); id. at 2563-64 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("While we
have repeatedly endorsed the principle that false statements of fact do not merit First Amendment
protection for their own sake, we have recognized that it is sometimes necessary to 'exten[d] a measure
of strategic protection' to these statements in order to ensure sufficient 'breathing space' for protected
speech.... And we have imposed '[e]xacting proof requirements' in other contexts as well when
necessary to ensure that truthful speech is not chilled.... All of these proof requirements inevitably
have the effect of bringing some false factual statements within the protection of the First Amendment,
but this is justified in order to prevent the chilling of other, valuable speech." (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620)).
233. Id. at 2551, 2556.
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protection: "The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the
Government advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment
protection. ' ,234 Justice Breyer's concurring opinion went even further,
suggesting that false speech might have some First Amendment value:
"False factual statements can serve useful human objectives, for
example: ... in technical, philosophical, and scientific contexts, where (as
Socrates' methods suggest) examination of a false statement (even if made
deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps
realize the truth., 235 Therefore, although the Sullivan protections are not
intended to protect false speech "for its own sake,, 236 this recent precedent
suggests that the dichotomy between unprotected false speech and
protected truthful speech might be less rigid than previously believed.
D. The First Amendment Is Applicable to Securities Regulation of
Noncommercial Speech
Finally, before applying the Sullivan balancing test to analyze whether
the First Amendment mandates any changes to the securities fraud liability
scheme, this Article must address the notion that securities regulation is
somehow immune from any First Amendment scrutiny. First, the Supreme
Court dictum cited for this proposition, even if afforded weight, is
inapplicable to the noncommercial speech that is within the scope of the
securities fraud statute. Second, the leading theoretical argument for this
First Amendment-free zone, the "institutional approach," is similarly
inapplicable to the non-corporate speech that is the subject of this Article.
The idea that securities regulation is somehow outside the bounds of
First Amendment review derives from the following dictum in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association:
Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are
regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the
exchange of information about securities, corporate proxy
statements, the exchange of price and production information
among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the
labor activities of employees. Each of these examples illustrates
that the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial
activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity. Neither Virginia Pharmacy nor Bates
234. Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
235. Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring).
236. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
("Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.").
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purported to cast doubt on the permissibility of these kinds of
commercial regulation.237
Ohralik's statement that the "exchange of information about securities"
238
can be regulated without offending the First Amendment, which some have
interpreted as meaning that all securities regulation is consistent with the
First Amendment,239 is triply inapplicable to the analysis in this Article.
First, Ohralik's characterization of securities regulation as
constitutional is obiter dictum.240 The issue in Ohralik was whether a state
could discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain,
and the Court held that a state may do so "under circumstances likely to
pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent. ', 24 1 The Court cited
securities regulation merely to exemplify that states have significant
latitude when regulating commercial speech. As such, the issue of the First
Amendment's application to securities regulation was not necessary to the
case's holding, thus constituting dictum. 242 Moreover, because the issue of
the constitutionality of securities regulation was not even briefed or argued,
the remark constitutes obiter dictum rather than arguably more persuasive
judicial dictum.243  Therefore, Ohralik's passing reference to the
appropriateness of securities regulation suffers from the same problems as
244all obiter dictum: a lack of consideration.
Second, Ohralik predates the Court's pronouncement of the Central
Hudson test to analyze the constitutionality of regulations on commercial
237. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (citations omitted).
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Brief for Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at
17, 20, SEC v. Siebel Syst., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04-5130) (opposing a First
Amendment challenge to Regulation FD, citing Ohralik and arguing that "securities law's commercial
regulation [sic] lie outside the boundaries of the First Amendment"); see also Antony Page, Taking
Stock of the First Amendment's Application to Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 797 n.47
(2007) (characterizing the 22 signatories of the Law Professors Brief as Amicus Curiae as "like a listing
from a Who's Who of securities professors").
240. See Page, supra note 239, at 802 ("Even if the Supreme Court's nearly thirty-year-old
dictum in Ohralik once foreclosed application of the First Amendment to securities regulation, that does
not necessarily foreclose its application now.").
241. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
242. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("When an opinion issues for
the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which
we are bound.").
243. See David Coale & Wendy Couture, Loud Rules, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 715, 725 & n.61 (2007)
(discussing the distinction between obiter dicta and judicial dicta).
244. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399-400 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The reason of this
maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its
full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case
decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.").
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speech.245 Indeed, the Central Hudson Court cited Ohralik as one of the
cases informing its pronounced test.246 Under current law, therefore, the
Central Hudson test should govern the constitutionality of securities
regulation of commercial speech. Indeed, numerous scholars-including
Professors Henry N. Butler,247 Lloyd L. Drury, 111,248 Susan B. Heyman,
249
Antony Page, 25  Larry E. Ribstein,251  and Eugene Volokh252-have
analyzed whether various securities regulations pass master under the
Central Hudson test, at least implicitly rejecting the suggestion that
securities regulation-even of commercial speech-is wholly immune
from First Amendment review.
Third, the discussion in Ohralik is limited to the securities regulation of
commercial speech. 3  Indeed, the vast majority of speech subject to
securities regulation is commercial, and thus most securities regulation
likely satisfies the Central Hudson test (consistent with the dictum in
Ohralik) 4 This Article establishes, however, that the securities fraud
245. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) ("In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.").
246. Id. at 563 (citing Ohralik in support of the proposition that "there can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about
lawful activity").
247. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 102-04 (applying the Central Hudson test to the
1933 Act's restrictions on general advertising and the 1934 Act's continuous reporting requirements).
248. See Drury, III, supra note 3, at 779-88 (applying the Central Hudson test to various
securities regulations),
249. See Heyman, supra note 3, at 218-24 (analyzing whether the Quiet Period Rules satisfy the
Central Hudson test).
250. See Page, supra note 239, at 829 ("Broadly speaking, the least important provisions of the
securities regulation regime, like those burdening the disclosure of nonmisleading information, are most
likely to be struck down [under Central Hudson]. The most important of these provisions, such as those
mandating disclosure of material commercial information, appear unlikely to be struck down.").
251. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 102-04.
252. See Volokh, supra note 123, at 1081 (explaining that, because prospectuses are commercial
speech, "fairly heavy SEC regulation of speech in such prospectuses is largely permissible").
253. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) ("In-person solicitation by a
lawyer of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which speech is an essential but
subordinate component. While this does not remove the speech from the protection of the First
Amendment, as was held in Bates and Virginia Pharmacy, it lowers the level of appropriate judicial
scrutiny.").
254. See Drury, 1II, supra note 3, at 785 ("The second type of SEC regulation, that which requires
disclosure of certain types of information, is the most common type of SEC regulation. This type of
regulation is not problematic from a commercial speech perspective."); Page, supra note 239, at 829
("It seems more likely that most securities regulations facing First Amendment scrutiny would
survive."); Volokh, supra note 123, at 1081 ("Commercial advertisements for products or services are
classic examples [of commercial speech]. So are stock prospectuses, which propose the purchase of
stock; this is why fairly heavy SEC regulation of speech in such prospectuses is largely permissible,
while similar SEC regulation of newsletters or newspapers that discuss stocks is not."); Russell Gerard
Ryan, Note, The Federal Securities Laws, the First Amendment, and Commercial Speech: A Call for
Consistency, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 57, 81 (1984) ("Since the 1933 and 1934 Acts regulate only
commercial speech, the proper test for their constitutional validity is the four-part analysis set forth in
Central Hudson ... ").
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statute extends beyond commercial speech to noncommercial speech, and
this Article's First Amendment inquiry focuses on the First Amendment
implications of regulating this noncommercial speech. Therefore, even if
Ohralik could be read to suggest that all securities regulation of
commercial speech is consistent with the First Amendment, this suggestion
would not foreclose this Article's inquiry.
The leading scholarly argument in favor of insulating securities
regulation from First Amendment scrutiny is Professor Frederick Schauer's
institutional approach to the First Amendment. Under this theory, First
Amendment protections should vary depending on whether the affected
institution's role in society implicates First Amendment values, with lines
drawn "between the institutional press and the lone pamphleteer, between
the Internet and an adult theater, between libraries and medical clinics, and
between the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Institutes of
Health., 255 Under this theory, the vast majority of securities regulation is
left untouched by the First Amendment because the institution of "the
corporation" does not implicate First Amendment values to the same
degree as other institutions like "the media.,
256
The institutional approach, albeit compelling, is subject to criticism,
and its premise has been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court,
including in Citizens United. Perhaps the strongest criticism of the
institutional approach, as articulated by Professor Dale Carpenter, is that
the process of "favoring some speakers and institutions over others risks
reintroducing the problems of partisanship, entrenchment, and
incompetence. 2 57 In other words, the institutional approach, which is
intended to better effectuate the values embedded in the First Amendment,
might, in practice, undercut those very values. 58 Moreover, although the
institutional approach has garnered some support among scholars, the
255. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1260
(2005) ("Carving First Amendment doctrine across rather than along the distinction between speech and
action may yield a First Amendment with less coherence as a matter of abstract principle, but may also
give us a First Amendment with greater ability to deal with the genuine issues of institutional autonomy
that lie at the heart of the multiple but overlapping background justifications for the idea of freedom of
speech.").
256. See Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1747, 1753 (2007) (identifying legislatures, banks, schools, universities, nonprofit organizations,
corporations, and newspapers as examples of "institutions"); Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech,
Securities Regulation, and an Institutional Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
613, 651 (2006) (applying the institutional approach to securities regulation and concluding that "very
strong institutional arguments seem to exist for permitting extensive regulation of corporate political
speech in order to preserve the integrity of the U.S. capital markets").
257. Dale Carpenter, The Value of Institutions and the Value of Free Speech, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1407, 1410 (2005).
258. See id. at 1411 ("Agnosticism and skepticism counsel against introducing yet another chance
for more such carving up to erode the pluralistic values of the First Amendment, at least unless we have
a very good reason to do so.").
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Supreme Court continues to reject the premise of this approach, including
recently in Citizens United by refusing to distinguish between individuals
and corporate institutions for purposes of First Amendment protection of
political speech.259
Moreover, the institutional approach does not foreclose this Article's
application of the Sullivan balancing test to noncommercial speech in the
securities fraud context. This Article does not analyze the free speech rights
of issuing corporations-institutions that arguably do not implicate First
Amendment values. Rather, this Article analyzes the free speech rights of
those noncommercial speakers whose speech might be subject to securities
fraud liability, including financial journalists. Under the institutional
approach, then, the institution of the financial press merits First
Amendment protections, whether in the context of defamation suits (as in
Sullivan) or in the context of securities fraud suits (as analyzed in this
Article).26°
Therefore, because securities fraud regulation implicates the First
Amendment, because securities fraud claims do not have talismanic
immunity from First Amendment scrutiny, and because the securities
regulation of noncommercial speech is not outside the scope of First
Amendment review, this Article will apply the Sullivan balancing test to
securities fraud claims imposing liability for noncommercial speech about
public companies.
V. THE SULLIVAN PROTECTIONS SHOULD APPLY TO SECURITIES FRAUD
CLAIMS BASED ON NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH ABOUT PUBLIC COMPANIES
This Part applies the Sullivan balancing test to securities fraud claims,
concluding that the Sullivan protections should apply to securities fraud
claims premised on noncommercial speech about public companies. This
Part also discusses some additional policy benefits of this proposal,
separate and apart from the First Amendment interests that this proposal
supports. Finally, this Part explains how this proposal adds to the body of
literature about the First Amendment implications of securities regulation.
259. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) ("Corporations and other associations,
like individuals, contribute to the 'discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas'
that the First Amendment seeks to foster. The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech
of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply
because such associations are not 'natural persons."' (citation omitted) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cali., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion))).
260. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 1780 ("Although the Supreme Court and the lower courts
occasionally brandished the First Amendment when securities regulation appeared to trench upon the
editorial content of newspapers and newsletters or upon the behavior of journalists, a frontal First
Amendment assault on the securities regulation system never got off the ground." (footnotes omitted)).
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A. The Sullivan Balancing Test Supports the Application of the
Sullivan Protections in Securities Fraud Cases
The Sullivan balancing test supports the importation of the Sullivan
protections into securities fraud liability. Interests weigh in favor of
imposing securities fraud liability on noncommercial speech about public
companies, and countervailing interests weigh in favor of encouraging this
type of speech. These interests are in tension because there is a high risk of
chilling noncommercial speech about public companies. On balance, the
Sullivan protections should apply to noncommercial speech about public
companies, with the effect of raising the evidentiary burden for scienter to
clear and convincing evidence and mandating independent appellate review
of the scienter finding.
1. Interests Weigh in Favor of Imposing Securities Fraud Liability on
Noncommercial Speech About Public Companies
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, of which the securities fraud
provision is a key part, was enacted in order to "insure the maintenance of
fair and honest markets" because securities transactions "upon securities
exchanges and over-the-counter markets are effected with a national public
interest.261 Congress delineated a number of ways that securities markets
affect the public interest, but perhaps the most pressing reason-both in the
midst of the Great Depression when the statute was enacted and now in the
wake of the so-called "Great Recession"262-is the relationship between the
securities markets and the overall economy:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment
and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which
burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the general
welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by
manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security
prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and
markets, and to meet such emergencies the Federal Government is
put to such great expense as to burden the national credit.263
261. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
262. The Great Recession, Five Years Later, NAT'L PUB. RADIo (Dec. 8, 2012, 8:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/12/08/166784038/the-great-recession-five-years-later National Public Radio
("This December is the fifth anniversary of the start of the Great Recession, which officially ran from
December 2007 to June 2009.").
263. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4).
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The importance of the securities markets to the overall economy, which
Congress recognized in 1934, is even more pronounced today.
The prohibition on securities fraud furthers the goal of maintaining fair
and honest markets in three ways. First, the Securities and Exchange
Commission is authorized to bring an action for a "permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order" when "any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting" a violation of the securities fraud
provision.264 Therefore, the SEC can use the securities fraud statute to
specifically deter fraud. 65 Second, the SEC is authorized to bring an action
to impose a civil penalty on any person who has violated the securities
fraud provision.266 Therefore, the SEC can also use the securities fraud
statute to generally deter fraud by those who would fear civil penalties.
267
Finally, individual investors who have bought or sold securities in reliance
on fraudulent misrepresentations possess an implied private right of action
against primary violators of the securities fraud provision.268 Like the
potential for civil penalties, the potential for private civil liability serves to
generally deter fraud.
Although the primary goal of the prohibition on securities fraud is to
deter fraud, it also serves the secondary interest of compensating injured
investors. First, in an innovation added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, civil
penalties collected by the SEC may be added to "a disgorgement fund or
other fund established for the benefit of the victims of such violation."
269
Second, in private rights of action, injured investors are entitled to recover
damages for their economic loSS.
2 70
The interests underlying securities fraud liability differ from the
interests underlying defamation liability in several ways. First, as explained
above, the primary interest underlying securities fraud liability is the
deterrence of fraud in order to promote fair and honest markets, with the
compensation of injured investors as merely a secondary interest. By
contrast, the primary interest underlying defamation liability is the
compensation of injured plaintiffs. 271 This distinction, while worthy of
264. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2012).
265. See 2 J. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 21:4
(2d ed. 2008) ("The issue is one of special deterrence versus general deterrence, with the former being
targeted at the defendant alone ... .
266. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3).
267. See LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 265, § 21:4 ("The issue is one of special deterrence versus
general deterrence, with... the latter [targeted] at society more generally, or at those similarly situated
as the defendant who might engage in similar conduct if not deterred by the penalty imposed on the
defendant.").
268. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975).
269. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012).
270. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
271. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)).
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note, is less marked than it first appears because defamation liability also
has a deterrence interest-namely, the deterrence of defamatory speech.
Therefore, the Sullivan protections have been applied to the detriment of a
deterrence interest. Indeed, in Garrison v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court
applied the Sullivan protections in a criminal libel suit,272 even though the
primary goals of criminal prosecution are deterrence and retribution, not
compensation.273 Moreover, the Court has not been unaware of the
deterrence interest underlying defamation liability. Rather, on a number of
occasions in concurring and dissenting opinions, members of the Court-in
an unsuccessful effort to curb the application of First Amendment
protections in defamation cases-have highlighted that the deterrence of
defamatory speech is a secondary goal of defamation liability.274 Therefore,
if the Sullivan protections were incorporated into the securities fraud
context, thereby undercutting some of the deterrent effect of the securities
fraud statute, this would not be an unprecedented application of these
protections.
Second, the compensation interest in securities fraud cases, to the
extent it is implicated, is for economic harm. 275  By contrast, the
compensation interest in the defamation context is for harm to reputation.276
This distinction, while worthy of note, should not be outcome-
determinative.277 In fact, the Supreme Court has previously applied the
Sullivan protections to the detriment of a non-reputational compensation
interest. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Supreme Court applied the Sullivan
protections in a "false light" right of privacy action, even though "the
272. 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
273. Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1383, 1383
(2002) ("[T]he overarching goals of criminal law are primarily deterrence, retribution, or some mixture
of the two.").
274. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 782 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that private plaintiffs should not bear the burden of proving falsity) ("Moreover, the preventive
effect of liability for defamation serves an important public purpose. For the rights and values of private
personality far transcend mere personal interests. Surely if the 1950's taught us anything, they taught us
that the poisonous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769, 771
(1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Sullivan rule should be replaced by a
limitation on "recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly threaten the press") ("The New
York Times rule thus countenances two evils: first, the stream of information about public officials and
public affairs is polluted and often remains polluted by false information; and second, the reputation
and professional life of the defeated plaintiff may be destroyed by falsehoods that might have been
avoided with a reasonable effort to investigate the facts.").
275. See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 338.
276. Masson, 501 U.S. at 516 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
277. See Solove & Richards, supra note 206, at 1681 ("[T]he nature of the injury approach does
not tell us which kinds of injuries count and which do not for First Amendment purposes. Even if one
could accurately identify different theories of damages that different forms of civil liability remedy (for
example, economic, reputational, hedonic), the nature of the injury approach fails to explain why
certain kinds of damages threaten the First Amendment while others do not ... ").
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primary damage is the mental distress from having been exposed to public
view, although injury to reputation may be an element bearing upon such
damage. ' 278  Subsequently, however, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., a right of publicity case, the Court recast the
compensation interest in Time, Inc. as reputational in an attempt to
differentiate the two cases. 279 A better differentiation, as noted above,
would have been to note that liability in Time was premised on falsity,
while liability in Zacchini was not.280 The Court also applied the Sullivan
protections to the detriment of a non-reputational compensation interest in
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, an intentional infliction of emotional
distress case, where the primary compensation interest identified was "not
reputational damage, but the severe emotional distress suffered by the
person who is the subject of an offensive publication. ,281 In addition to the
Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the interest in compensating
injury to reputation is not the only interest that could ever give way to First
Amendment consideration, there is no policy rationale for treating the
interest in compensating injury to reputation as especially vulnerable. To
the contrary, because one's reputation is so fragile and cannot be easily
repaired, it would seem that a reputational compensation interest would be
especially strong in the face of competing First Amendment considerations.
Finally, lower courts have not shied away from applying the Sullivan
protections in cases where the compensation interest was not for
reputational harm.282
278. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-87 n.9 (1967) ("Moreover,... the published matter
need not be defamatory, on its face or otherwise, and might even be laudatory and still warrant
recovery."); id. at 389 (noting that, under the statute, "nondefamatory matter" was potentially
actionable); id. at 391 ("Were this a libel action, . . . the additional state interest in the protection of the
individual against damage to his reputation would be involved.").
279. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (distinguishing Time,
which extended the Sullivan protections to "false light" right of privacy claims asserted by private
individuals based on a public interest, from the instant case, involving a "right of publicity" claim)
("[T]he State's interests in providing a cause of action in each instance are different. 'The interest
protected' in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light 'is clearly that of reputation,
with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation.' By contrast, the State's interest in
permitting a 'right of publicity' is in protecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part
to encourage such entertainment." (citation omitted)).
280. See SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292-93 (D. Utah 2010)
("Importantly, that case [Zacchini] did not involve an allegedly wrongful statement.").
281. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
282. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the
actual malice standard in a "right of publicity" case where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
appropriated his name and likeness); Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522-24
(4th Cir. 1999) (applying the actual malice standard to claims for breach of loyalty and trespass
because, although these are non-reputational tort claims, the plaintiff sought "publication damages");
Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191,
196 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the actual malice standard to a tortious interference claim, where the
plaintiff sought to recover damages for lost business resulting from the publication); In re Enron Corp.
Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825-26 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (applying the actual
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Third, the private plaintiff who asserts a securities fraud suit is not the
subject of the speech, unlike the private plaintiff in a defamation suit. To
date, no Supreme Court case has applied the Sullivan protections in a
private action where the injured plaintiff was not the subject of the false
speech at issue. This distinction, although again worthy of note, should not
be outcome-determinative. For one, as noted above, the Court has applied
the Sullivan standard in a criminal libel case, where the State was not the
subject of the alleged defamation.28 3 Additionally, lower courts have not
been averse to extending the Sullivan protection to claims where the
plaintiff is not the subject of the speech.284
Finally, the private plaintiff in a securities fraud case is not completely
disconnected from the false speech at issue. In order to have standing to
assert a securities fraud claim, a private plaintiff must have been a
purchaser or seller of the subject security.285 Therefore, although a private
plaintiff is not personally the subject of the speech at issue, the plaintiff, to
the extent the subject security was an equity security like common stock, is
or was an owner of the company who was the subject of the speech.
In sum, there are differences between the interests in favor of imposing
securities fraud liability and those in favor of imposing defamation liability,
but these differences do not necessarily mean that the balance of interests
does not support the importation of the Sullivan protections into securities
fraud cases. Rather, they merely reinforce that the Sullivan standard should
not be incorporated "blindly" into the securities fraud context without
performing a balancing test specific to the implicated interests.28 6
2. Interests Weigh in Favor of Encouraging Noncommercial Speech
About Public Companies
Balanced against the interests in favor of imposing securities fraud
liability are the First Amendment interests in favor of encouraging this type
of speech. Noncommercial speech-such as by securities analysts, credit
rating agencies, or financial journalists-about public companies is an
essential voice in the "marketplace of ideas":
malice standard in a negligence action asserted by one of Enron's lenders against Enron's rating
agencies); County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., Inc., 245 B.R. 151, 154, 157 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(applying the actual malice standard to breach of contract and professional negligence claims asserted
by a bond issuer against a bond rating service for allegedly inaccurate ratings).
283. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
284. See, e.g., Enron, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26 (applying the actual malice standard in a
negligence action asserted by one of Enron's lenders against Enron's rating agencies).
285. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
286. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 56; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 49-50
(1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967).
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The public interest is served equally when reporters find a "Deep
Throat" in the executive suite, and when an accounting professor
spotlights for the financial press, in common language, business
dealings he regards as improper, improvident or unfair to investors.
Whether his conclusions are right is to be resolved generally in the
free market place of ideas.287
This noncommercial speech about public companies promotes honest and
efficient markets.
First, this disinterested speech-which is often the product of in-depth
information gathering and analysis288-serves to balance out the interested
speech of companies, thus promoting honest markets. 289 Honest markets
are important for several reasons. First, when markets are honest, they are
less likely to swing wildly, which is essential to economic stability.
2 90
Additionally, potential investors are more likely to invest in honest
markets, so honest markets are essential to promoting capital-raising and
liquidity.2 91
Second, noncommercial speech about public companies, often by
financial experts, serves as an essential conduit between publicly disclosed
information and market prices, thus promoting market efficiency. 92
Efficient markets, which reflect all publicly available information,29 3 are
287. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 791 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
economic information Dun & Bradstreet disseminates in its credit reports makes an undoubted
contribution to this private discourse essential to our well-being.").
288. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (discussing how securities analysts "ferret out and
analyze information" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
289. See id. at 659 n.18 (describing how a securities analyst's "careful investigation brought to
light a massive fraud at the corporation" which "might well have gone undetected longer" without his
efforts); In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he function of financial
reporters and security analysts is to determine the truth about the affairs of publicly traded
companies.").
290. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (2012) (identifying the economic impacts of "sudden and unreasonable
fluctuations in the prices of securities," including the contraction of available credit).
291. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 235 n.12 (2010) (citing authority that investors
are less likely to invest if they cannot trust the honesty of markets, "thereby reducing the liquidity of the
securities markets to the detriment of investors and issuers alike" (quoting In re Carnation Co.,
Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 SEC Docket 1025, 1030 (July 8, 1985))); United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("[A]n animating purpose of the Exchange Act [was] to insure
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.").
292. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 n.24 (recognizing the role of market professionals in considering
"most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market
prices"); Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 n.17 (citing the SEC's briefing for the proposition that securities
analysis enhances market efficiency, which "redounds to the benefit of all investors"); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 n.9 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (explaining that credit
reports "facilitate through the price system the improvement of human welfare").
293. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (explaining that in an efficient market, all publicly available
information is reflected in the market price).
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more stable markets, which inure to the benefit of all. In addition, an
efficient market conveys important information to investors, "'acting as the
unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information
available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.'
294
3. There Is a High Risk of Chilling Noncommercial Speech About
Public Companies
Next, after identifying the interests in favor of imposing securities
fraud liability and those in favor of encouraging the subject speech, one
must determine the degree to which the threat of securities fraud liability
has a chilling effect. This analysis involves two inquiries: (1) the likelihood
of erroneous speech and (2) the costs of securities fraud liability.
First, there is a high risk of error in noncommercial speech about public
companies, which increases the chilling effect of potential securities fraud
liability. Noncommercial speech, by definition, is by disinterested third
parties, thus heightening the risk of erroneous speech. Additionally, speech
about public companies, whose financial statements are often incredibly
complicated, is especially prone to error. Indeed, companies themselves are
often forced to restate their own financials in the wake of erroneous
disclosures.295 When the speaker is an independent third party, the risk of
erroneous speech increases exponentially. In a recent example, David Cay
Johnston, a Pulitzer-prize winning financial journalist and Reuters
columnist, misread News Corp's annual reports and reported that the
company had received a $4.8 billion tax refund during the period from
2007 through 2010 rather than paying that much in taxes during the
period.
2 96
Second, the costs of securities fraud liability are daunting, thus
increasing the chilling effect of that liability. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly bemoaned that, because of the high costs of securities
297litigation, defendants may be forced to settle even unmeritorious cases.
294. Id. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
295. See Lynn E. Turner & Thomas R. Weirich, A Closer Look at Financial Statement
Restatements, CPA J., Dec. 2006, at 12, 14 ("Exhibit I presents a restatements scorecard for 2005.
Companies with U.S.-listed securities filed 1,295 financial restatements, nearly double the previous
year's mark. This represents about one restatement for every 12 public companies (up from one for
every 23 in 2004).").
296. David Cay Johnston, How I Misread New Corp's Taxes, REUTERS (July 13, 2011),
www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN1E76C25320110713 (explaining that he misread the
parentheses in the "cash paid for taxes" line in the financial statements as reflecting a tax refund rather
than a tax payment).
297. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994)
(There has been widespread recognition that 'litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general."'
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975))).
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The Court has used similar rhetoric when discussing the reasons why the
potential for defamation liability has such a strong chilling effect on
speech.298 Admittedly, this Author has previously argued that, in light of
the various judicial and legislative restrictions on private securities fraud
suits over the past thirty-eight years, securities fraud litigation no longer
poses a danger of vexatiousness greater than that posed by other types of
high-dollar litigation.299 That is not to say, however, that securities fraud
liability is no longer costly; undoubtedly it is.
Therefore, the high risk of erroneous speech, combined with the high
costs of securities fraud litigation and liability, operate to create a chilling
effect on noncommercial speech about public companies. For example,
after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Pirate Investor LLC v. SEC,
300
the New York Times published an editorial, titled "The Right to Be Wrong,"
in which it warned: "[I]f the S.E.C. does not begin to stick to actual
securities fraud and stop whittling at the First Amendment, financial
journalism could become more cautious and less robust.,
30 1
As another example of the potentially chilling effect of potential
securities liability, consider the fall-out from the Dodd-Frank Act's
nullification of Securities Act Rule 436(g).3 °2 Rule 436(g) had exempted
credit ratings included in registration statements from liability under § 11
of the Securities Act.303 Under § 11, an expert is strictly liable for its false
or misleading statements included in a registration statement, subject to a
due diligence defense.304 Upon the nullification of Rule 436(g), credit
rating agencies, chilled by the potential for liability, began refusing to
consent to the inclusion of their ratings within registration statements. In
turn, the asset-backed securities issue market froze because Regulation AB
requires the inclusion of credit ratings in the prospectuses of asset-backed
securities. 30 5 As a short-term solution, the SEC issued a no-action letter,
298. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) ("The largely uncontrolled
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of
any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion
rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact.").
299. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, The End of the Vexatiousness Rationale, 41 SEC. REG. L.J.
301 (2013) ("The vexatiousness rationale is no longer viable. As explained above, the bases for the
Supreme Court's adoption of this policy heuristic are now largely defunct, and there is not an
intervening basis for the rationale.").
300. Pirate Investor LLC v. SEC, 130 S. Ct. 3506 (2010) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
301. Editorial, The Right to Be Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2010, at WK6.
302. Dodd-Frank Act § 939G ("Rule 436(g), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission under the Securities Act of 1933, shall have no force or effect.").
303. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2014).
304. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).
305. Gretchen Morgenson, Hey, S.E.C., That Escape Hatch Is Still Open, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2011, at BUI ("The agencies responded by refusing to allow their ratings to be disclosed in asset-
backed securities deals. As a result, the market for these instruments froze on July 22.").
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stating that, "[p]ending further notice, the Division will not recommend
enforcement action to the Commission if an asset-backed issuer ... omits
the ratings disclosure required by Item 1103(a)(9) and 1120 of Regulation
AB from a prospectus that is part of a registration statement relating to an
offering of asset-backed securities.' 30 6 Although this example arose in the
context of § 11 liability rather than § 10(b) liability, it demonstrates the
chilling effect of the potential of securities liability for allegedly false or
misleading statements.
4. On Balance, the Sullivan Protections Should Apply
Finally, one must balance these competing interests. On the one hand,
the imposition of securities fraud liability promotes honest markets through
deterrence and compensates injured investors. On the other hand,
noncommercial speech about public companies promotes honest and
efficient markets. These interests are in tension because erroneous
statements are inevitable and because securities liability is costly.
Therefore, the threat of potential securities fraud liability has a chilling
effect on noncommercial speech. The central issue is whether the current
liability scheme appropriately balances these competing considerations or
whether the scale is tipped too far in one direction.
The competing interests in the securities fraud context are especially
interesting because both sides seek to promote honest markets, merely via
different means. The imposition of securities fraud liability promotes
honest markets by deterring fraud, while encouraging noncommercial
speech promotes honest markets by adding to the marketplace of ideas.
While both means of promoting honest markets are important, the policy
underlying the First Amendment is to trust the marketplace of ideas to out
the truth, rather than to rely on the stifling of speech: "' [T]he ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-. . . the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.'9
30 7
306. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/fordO72210-1120.htm. ("We understand that the
rating agencies continue to indicate that that [sic] they are not willing to provide their consent at this
time, and that without an extension of our no-action position, offerings of asset-backed securities would
not be able to be conducted on a registered basis.").
307. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (alteration in original) (quoting
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also Desai, supra note
64, at 508 ("The Supreme Court's preference for increased speech by all, and its embrace of
information technology and counter-speech to correct a false claim instead of banning the speech,
points to a new world where all speak, and it is believed that the mixing and mashing of ideas will allow
the best answers to arise to correct falsehoods and lead our decisions.").
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Therefore, consistent with the policy underlying the First Amendment,
one must determine whether the current securities fraud liability scheme
affords sufficient breathing room, so as to encourage contributions to the
marketplace of ideas. Compellingly, under current precedent, a securities
fraud defendant could be subject to liability at a lower standard than if the
defendant were sued for defamation. Of course, there are other protections
in place in a securities fraud case-including the heightened pleading
standards 30 8 and the element of materiality 3 9-which could conceivably
add to the breathing space afforded those who speak about securities.
310
Despite these additional protections, however, this Article contends that
securities fraud liability should not be imposed at standards lower than
would apply if the very same defendant were sued for defamation. When
the securities markets fail to reflect accurate information about companies,
the ripple effects impact the entire economy, with Enron as a quintessential
example. These external impacts are perhaps even more harmful to society
than the impacts when the truth about a public figure is not exposed via
speech. Therefore, to the extent that a noncommercial speaker is sued for
securities fraud premised on speech about public companies, this Article
contends that the Sullivan protections should apply.
311
This Article's recommendation is consistent with several lower courts
that have applied the Sullivan protections in similar contexts. For example,
308. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring a private plaintiff to plead "with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind"); FED. R.
Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring a party to "state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud"). But see
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(B) (2012) ("In the case of an action for money damages brought against a
credit rating agency or a controlling person under this chapter, it shall be sufficient, for purposes of
pleading any required state of mind in relation to such action, that the complaint state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the credit rating agency knowingly or recklessly failed--(i) to
conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security with respect to the factual elements relied upon
by its own methodology for evaluating credit risk; or (ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such
factual elements (which verification may be based on a sampling technique that does not amount to an
audit) from other sources that the credit rating agency considered to be competent and that were
independent of the issuer and underwriter.").
309. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (explaining that the materiality element of
a securities fraud claim is satisfied if there is a significant likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider the misrepresentation important in deciding how to invest).
310. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553-54 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring with
plurality) ("I ... must concede that many statutes and common-law doctrines make the utterance of
certain kinds of false statements unlawful. These prohibitions, however, tend to be narrower than the
statute before us, in that they limit the scope of their application .... Fraud statutes, for example,
typically require proof of a misrepresentation that is material, upon which the victim relied, and which
caused actual injury.").
311. Note that, in the defamation context, all of the potentially actionable statements are, by
definition, harmful to the public company's reputation. In the securities fraud context, on the other
hand, both unduly positive and unduly negative statements are potentially actionable, with both buyers
and sellers having standing to sue. Therefore, if the Sullivan protections were imported into the
securities fraud context, they would prevent the chilling of both positive and negative speech about
public companies. Because both types of speech are essential to an efficient market, this difference
should not be determinative.
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in First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Standard & Poor's Corp., plaintiff
investors asserted common law fraud claims against Standard & Poor's for
publishing an allegedly inaccurate description of a company's convertible
bonds.3 12 Relying on Time, Inc. v. Hill, the court held that "the First
Amendment requires a demonstration of actual malice where plaintiff seeks
to impose liability on a newspaper for publication of a non-defamatory
misstatement." 313 Similarly, in In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative &
"ERISA" Litigation, the court applied the "actual malice" standard in a
negligent misrepresentation action asserted by one of Enron's lenders
against Enron's rating agencies.314
There are two alternative means of incorporating this Article's
recommendation that the Sullivan protections apply in securities fraud
claims asserted against noncommercial speakers. First, in light of the
constitutional overlay, courts could re-interpret the "in connection with"
requirement as coextensive with commercial speech. This solution is
arguably consistent with the general canon that statutes should be construed
so as to be constitutional, 31 5 but it would cut a broad swathe of speakers
completely out of the reach of the securities fraud laws. All noncommercial
speech would be outside the scope of the securities fraud statute,
obliterating any chilling effect but also any deterrence effect. Moreover,
without any textual basis in the statute for this interpretation, 31 6 this general
canon of constitutional avoidance is likely inapplicable. 317 Second, courts
could-as in the defamation context-superimpose the Sullivan protections
only in circumstances involving public figures and noncommercial
speakers. Although this solution is more unwieldy, it is closest to
Congress's intention of subjecting any speech in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities to potential securities fraud liability. This
Article recommends the latter solution, as the least drastic and the most
consistent with congressional intent.
312. 690 F. Supp. 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
313. Id. at 258-59.
314. 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 825-26 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
315. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005) (explaining that the constitutional
avoidance canon is "a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text,
resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious
constitutional doubts").
316. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) ("As in all statutory
construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute.").
317. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008) ("The canon of constitutional avoidance
does not supplant traditional modes of statutory interpretation. We cannot ignore the text and purpose of
a statute in order to save it." (citation omitted)); SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 253 (4th
Cir. 2009) ("[T]he text and purpose of § 10(b) admit of no exclusion for 'disinterested publishers' of
financial news and commentary, thus rendering constitutional avoidance arguments irrelevant."); cf
Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 104-11 (1985) (interpreting the breadth of the statutory exclusion from the
investment Advisors Act for bona fide publishers against the backdrop of First Amendment precedent).
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B. This Article's Recommendation Serves Important Additional Policy
Goals
This Article's recommendation that the Sullivan protections should
apply to noncommercial speech in the context of securities fraud, in
addition to achieving the appropriate balance between deterring fraud and
encouraging speech, serves several other important policy goals.
First, this Article's recommendation would incentivize gatekeepers,
like securities analysts and credit rating agencies, to avoid conflicts of
interest. These important market professionals have been plagued with
charges that their speech has been conflicted in favor of the covered
companies, with analysts allegedly motivated to please their firms'
investment banking clients318 and with credit rating agencies allegedly
motivated to compete for issuers' business.319 As discussed above,
conflicted analysis or credit ratings should be classified as commercial
speech because conflicted analysts and credit rating agencies act more like
selling agents for the covered companies, thus "merely proposing a
commercial transaction," rather than like disinterested third-party
commenters. 320 This Article recommends that the Sullivan protections only
apply to securities fraud claims premised on noncommercial speech-and
thus not to securities fraud claims asserted against conflicted credit rating
agencies and securities analysts. Therefore, the adoption of this Article's
recommendation would serve as an incentive for these gatekeepers to avoid
conflicts of interest, in addition to their "reputational capital" incentive.
321
Second, in the wake of Citizens United, this recommendation
encourages the addition of more non-corporate speech to the marketplace
of ideas, which runs the risk of being overrun by corporate speech. This
recommendation is consistent with, albeit perhaps more limited than, other
scholars' proposals to balance out the corporate speech unleashed by
Citizens United. For example, Professor Deven R. Desai argues for the
recognition of a "corporate public figure doctrine," which would apply the
Sullivan protections to all speech about public figure corporations,
including commercial speech.322 This Article's recommendation is more
limited than Professor Desai's because it retains the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech (in light of the lesser risk of
318. See generally SEC, supra note 142..
319. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 65, at xxv.
320. Flying Dog Brewery, LLLP v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n, 870 F. Supp. 2d 477, 486
(W.D. Mich. 2012).
321. See Ellis, Fairchild, & D'Souza, supra note 192, at 211 ("This section addresses whether or
not imposition of civil liability upon CRAs is desirable. To some extent, any discussion of imposition of
civil liability on CRAs is part of a larger discussion of whether regulation is needed or whether CRAs
are sufficiently incentivized by their desire to protect their reputational capital.").
322. Desai, supra note 64, at 459.
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chilling commercial speech) and because it argues that the application of
Sullivan protections should be analyzed on a cause-of-action by cause-of-
action basis (in light of the unique interests that are balanced by every
cause of action). This Article agrees with Professor Desai, however, that
current regulation of speech about corporations is out of balance and that
expansion of the Sullivan protections is a solution.3 23 This Article responds
to this imbalance in the context of securities fraud regulation.
C. This Article's Recommendation Adds to the Literature About the
Constitutionality of Securities Regulation
Finally, this Article's recommendation contributes to the literature
about the constitutionality of securities regulation. First, this Article adds to
the scholarship about the First Amendment implications of securities
regulation by demonstrating that securities regulation is not limited to
commercial speech. Second, this Article's analysis of the constitutionality
of securities fraud liability builds upon the few scholarly discussions about
the First Amendment implications of § 10(b) by demonstrating that the
Sullivan protections should apply to securities fraud claims premised on
noncommercial speech about public companies. Finally, this Article
complements the scholarship discussing the potential applicability of the
Sullivan protection to claims under § 1 1 of the Securities Act and § 14(a) of
the Exchange Act, providing guidance to scholars engaged in this parallel
inquiry.
This Article adds to the body of scholarship about the First
Amendment implications of securities regulation by demonstrating that
securities regulation is not limited to commercial speech. Most scholarship
about the First Amendment implications of securities regulation focuses on
whether various provisions pass muster under the Central Hudson test that
applies to the regulation of commercial speech, with most scholars
concluding that the vast majority of securities regulation passes muster.324
The securities regulations most likely to fail the Central Hudson test are
"those that prohibit the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading, and
323. See id. at 509 ("Corporations thus have increased speech rights while speech about them is
unduly limited.").
324. See, e.g., Drury, III, supra note 3, at 785 ("The second type of SEC regulation, that which
requires disclosure of certain types of information, is the most common type of SEC regulation. This
type of regulation is not problematic from a commercial speech perspective."); Page, supra note 239, at
829 ("It seems more likely that most securities regulations facing First Amendment scrutiny would
survive."); Ryan, supra note 254, at 81 ("Since the 1933 and 1934 Acts regulate only commercial
speech, the proper test for their constitutional validity is the four-part analysis set forth in Central
Hudson .. "); Volokh, supra note 123, at 1081 ("Commercial advertisements for products or services
are classic examples [of commercial speech]. So are stock prospectuses, which propose the purchase of
stock; this is why fairly heavy SEC regulation of speech in such prospectuses is largely permissible,
while similar SEC regulation of newsletters or newspapers that discuss stocks is not.").
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sometimes material speech based on paternalistic concerns. 325 For
example, various scholars have contended that the Quiet Period Rules326
and Regulation FD,327  which regulate truthful speech, constitute
impermissible regulation of commercial speech. This Article adds to this
body of scholarship about the First Amendment implications of securities
regulation by demonstrating that securities regulation reaches
noncommercial speech. In particular, the securities fraud statute, which
applies to all speech in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
reaches beyond commercial speech to regulate some noncommercial
speech.
This Article also adds to the much smaller body of scholarship
focusing on the First Amendment implications of the securities fraud
statute. First, several scholars have argued that the securities fraud statute,
in the context of insider trading, arguably reaches beyond noncommercial
speech and violates the First Amendment. 2 8 Second, several scholars have
concluded that the statute, in the context of affirmative misrepresentations,
likely satisfies the Central Hudson test.329 This Article builds on this
325. Heyman, supra note 3, at 217; see also Drury, II1, supra note 3, at 780 ("If the courts ever
were to consider securities regulations to be commercial speech, SEC rules that prohibit the
dissemination of truthful information ought not withstand any serious scrutiny. The commercial speech
cases do not allow a paternalistic concern for whether hearers can handle truthful information to serve
as the basis for prohibition of this type of speech.").
326. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 102 ("[U]nder Central Hudson, the
constitutionality of the 1933 act is doubtful to the extent that the act prohibits statements that are neither
unlawful nor misleading-any statements made before the statutory prospectus is available, and written
statements not accompanied or preceded by a statutory prospectus."); Drury, II1, supra note 3, at 780
("This combination of authority puts SEC regulations forbidding accurate speech on very weak footing.
Examples of these types of regulations are the rules relating to the offering of securities, such as the
'gun jumping' rules ...."); Heyman, supra note 3, at 189 ("The Quiet Period Rules are also
problematic from a First Amendment perspective .... If challenged under the commercial speech
doctrine, the broad prophylactic restrictions on the scope and timing of promotional activity in the
capital markets would unlikely withstand First Amendment scrutiny.").
327. Drury, III, supra note 3, at 788 ("If a litigant can provide courts with the empirical evidence
that Regulation FD stifles a substantial amount of truthful speech by issuers, the courts should give
serious consideration to whether it should strike down the regulation as an unlawful prohibition of
commercial speech under the First Amendment."); Page & Yang, supra note 4, at 83 ("Even assuming
that the SEC's interests are substantial or compelling, Regulation FD appears both fatally
underinclusive and overinclusive at the same time. There are also other less restrictive alternatives. The
courts should not uphold the SEC's choice to regulate speech rather than actual securities trading,
which is the source of the perceived underlying harm.").
328. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 139, at 299 ("The Winans case is a good reminder that there
are many instances in which a fraud prosecution will seriously impinge on traditional press media and
their control over news content.... Extension of SEC fraud and criminal doctrine to the Wall Street
Journal reporter is dangerous since it serves as the camel's nose under the tent for legislation regulating
considerable areas of newspaper coverage.").
329. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 3, at 105 ("To the extent that the antifraud rules
impose federal liability for fraudulent statements, they may withstand constitutional scrutiny under
Central Hudson."); Thomas J. Pate, Triple-A Ratings Stench: May the Credit Rating Agencies Be Held
Accountable?, 14 BARRY L. REv. 25, 46 (2010) ("In particular, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that commercial speech can be regulated to the extent that it is false or misleading. In fact, the
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literature by demonstrating that the securities fraud statute reaches
noncommercial speech outside of the insider-trading context by imposing
liability on alleged misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. As such, this Article asserts the new arguments that: (1)
the Sullivan balancing test should apply to securities fraud claims premised
on allegedly false noncommercial speech about public companies; and (2)
pursuant to that test, the Sullivan protections should be imported into
securities fraud cases to the extent they impose liability on noncommercial
speech about public companies.
Finally, this Article complements the literature discussing whether the
Sullivan protections should apply to other securities claims premised on
misrepresentations, such as claims asserted under § 11 of the Securities Act
and § 14(a) of the Exchange Act.330 As this Article demonstrates, the first
step of this analysis is to determine whether these claims reach beyond
commercial speech to impose liability on noncommercial speech. In a very
limited fashion, § 11 may do so to the extent that it now imposes liability
on credit ratings agencies for ratings included in registration statements.331
Similarly, § 14(a), which imposes liability for misleading proxy
solicitations, may also reach some noncommercial speech, especially in
light of the political nature of much proxy speech.332 The second step,
assuming that the claim potentially reaches noncommercial speech, is to
apply the Sullivan balancing test to the unique interests implicated by the
subject cause of action.333 This Article's application of the Sullivan
balancing test in the context of securities fraud, therefore, serves merely as
an example of how to perform this analysis, not as a prediction of whether
the Sullivan protections should apply to other types of securities liability.
regulation of false or misleading statements is the essence of the Securities laws and, in particular, is the
characteristic that makes Rule 1 Ob-5 claims possible.").
330. See Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV.
223, 322 (1990) (analyzing whether the "actual malice" standard should apply to claims asserted under
§ 14(a) of the Exchange Act).
331. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); see also Dodd-Frank Act § 939G ("Rule 436(g), promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933, shall have no force or effect.").
332. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012); BUTLER & RIBSTE1N, supra note 3, at 93-100 (applying the
theoretical underpinnings for the commercial-political speech distinction to proxy speech and
concluding that "[t]he foregoing analysis strongly supports characterizing proxy regulation as political
speech"); Wolfson, supra note 139, at 282 ("The point is that the federal proxy rules permit an intrusion
into what appears to be a political and artistic process.").
333. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 330, at 322-23 (balancing the interests implicated by § 14(a)
liability and concluding that "proxy solicitation does not appear to be the kind of expression for which
the [F]irst [A]mendment demands the 'strategic protection for falsehood' provided by a Sullivan-type




In conclusion, this Article seeks to correct the imbalance that occurs
when the First Amendment and securities fraud collide. In particular, this
Article argues that the Sullivan protections should apply in securities fraud
cases when the defendant is a noncommercial speaker and the speech
concerns a public company. In addition to preventing the chilling of
valuable speech, this recommendation will incentivize market professionals
to prevent conflicts of interest, so as to benefit from the Sullivan
protections, and encourage additional non-corporate speech about public
companies, in the wake of the expanded corporate speech rights afforded
by Citizens United. Finally, this Article adds to the literature on the
constitutionality of securities regulation by demonstrating that, in the
context of securities fraud, securities regulation reaches noncommercial
speech, by arguing that the Sullivan protections should apply to this
noncommercial speech, and by providing a framework for future scholars
to analyze whether there should be a First Amendment overlay on other
securities claims. Indeed, this Author encourages other scholars, whether
they be securities scholars or First Amendment scholars or both, to
continue this discussion about the collision between the First Amendment
and securities regulation.
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